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Given the impending vulnerability of U.S. ICBMs, this
thesis assesses the viability of countervailing reflexive
launch strategies. Although capabilities are discussed,
this thesis is non-technical and unclassified. Arguments
are based on logical analysis of capabilities within the
context of political realities.
This thesis establishes the relative utility of reflex-
ive launch strategies as part of the total strategic deterrent
posture. Presentation of evidence (logical; historical;
quantitative) supports a case for specific reflexive launch
options. The central thesis is that regardless of technical
capabilities (e.g., warning systems or C ) reflexive strate-
gies are not substantial enough to act as a doctrinal shield
for inherently vulnerable land-based forces. Alternatively,
it will be shown that within the context of existing/projected
U.S. weapon systems (e.g., MX, ALCM) , as well as Soviet forces
and perceptions, the capability for rapid retaliation prior to
impact or immediately following an attack will remain an
essential element of a credible deterrent. It is argued that
survivable weapons simply shift vulnerability to the centers
of political and economic power and do not obviate the require-
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In later time periods, when we have many protected
and dispersed ICBM's it may be possible to fire
ICBM' s on the basis of radar or other tactical
warning, since under these circumstances the enemy
must fire large numbers of missiles and thus possi-
bly be forced to give certain evidence of his in-
tentions. This is unlikely to be true in the
immediate future. For this and other reasons the
early ICBM' s cannot now rely solely on quick
reaction for their protection. This does not mean







Given the impending vulnerability of U.S. ICBMs, this
thesis assesses the viability of countervailing reflexive
launch strategies. Although capabilities are discussed,
this thesis is non-technical and unclassified. Arguments
are based on logical analysis of capabilities within the
context of political realities.
This thesis establishes the relative utility of reflex-
ive launch strategies as part of the total strategic deterrent
posture. Presentation of evidence (logical; historical;
quantitative) supports a case for specific reflexive launch
options. The central thesis is that regardless of technical
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capabilities (e.g. , warning systems or C ) reflexive strate-
gies are not substantial enough to act as a doctrinal shield
for inherently vulnerable land-based forces. Alternatively,
it will be shown that within the context of existing/projected
U.S. weapon systems (e.g., MX, ALCM, as well as Soviet forces
and perceptions, the capability for rapid retaliation prior
to impact or immediately following an attack will remain an
essential element of a credible deterrent. It is argued
that survivable weapons simply shift vulnerability to the
centers of political and economic power and do not obviate
the requirement for deterring reflexive launch options .

A. REFLEXIVE LAUNCH STRATEGIES
The evolution of strategic weapon systems capabilities
and vulnerabilities, within a symbiotic context of political
relationships, has periodically necessitated development of
quick reaction launch strategies. Reflexive launch strate-
gies as discussed in this paper cover a spectrum of rapid
response ICBM launch options ranging from a retaliatory
response in reaction to initial warning, to a strategic force
launch--as the "dust settles"—following an initial Soviet
nuclear attack. The use of the word reflex as an analogue
to describe these strategies is appropriate in several ways:
• The response is required for defense.
• The response is predetermined.
• Reaction time available requires bypassing the routine
decision process/network.
• The ability to bypass the full decision process does
not preclude inhibition of the response mechanism, or
intercession during the response process.
All of these reflexive launch concepts share the follow-
ing key characteristics:
• Dependence on a highly reliable warning network:
• A commitment to rely on unilateral information sources
and decision processes: Due to time constraints the
decision to launch would be made without consultation
with allies or the Soviets. However, it is possible
that corroborative information could be received from
allied forces (e.g. , direct attacks or mobilization of
Warsaw Pact forces)
.
• Acceptance of (worst case) warning-to-launch-comraitment
times of from 15 to 30 minutes.

• Acceptance of a devolution of launch authority, if
required, as a result of loss of the President or
communication between the forces and the NCA.
• Preplanned, rapidly reprogrammable, flexible response
options: The idea that the decision maker selects
from a previously developed "menu" of defensive/re-
taliatory attack packages. This preplanned response
not only meets the demands of a small (i.e., less than
4 minutes) launch window, but also recognizes that
even with survivable forces, major elements of the
decision making and supportive infoirmation systems may
be destroyed.
The above listed essential features of RLSs form the
basis for the major argument against these strategies. That
the response is made without careful consideration of enemy
and friendly force status, political consultation with allies
or post-attack development of a coordinated response plan.
As F. P. Hoeber states.
The question, "Launch against what?", is non-
trivial: Against cities, and insure disaster?
against Soviet silos, presumably partially
empty? against some perhaps mixed, target set
that may not turn out—after we had largely
disarmed ourselves—to be an effective set?
In short, do we want to escalate without
thinking or negotiating?-^
Hoeber' s questions are interesting; however, they leave
unstated a distinct set of questions regarding the alterna-
tive: l£ we delay launch, will we have the information or
the level of competence required to make a "better" decision?
Would delay permit uninhibited, irreversible Soviet attack
momentum (e.g., conventional invasion of Western Europe)?
Would a policy of "wait and negotiate" lead to a "rational"
decision of negotiated (i.e., western block vital compromise)
10

settlement with no retaliation? Does such a logic pro-





A. SOVIET COUNTERFORCE CAPABILITY
The essential nature of war as a continuation of
politics does not change with the technology of
armament. When atomic and hydrogen weapons are
employed surprise is one of the decisive condi-
tions for the attainment of success not only in
battles and operations but also in war as a
whole.
We cannot ignore the lessons of history and we
must always be ready for pre-emptive actions
against the perfidy of the aggressors.
Marshal P. A. Rotmistrov
1955
We do have a problem with regard to the surviva-
bility of the Minuteman force, and the options
are more limited than they were before; but that
is the price that we have chosen to pay in order
to put an upper limit on the total raw strategic
power in the Soviet ICBMs.
Dr. John S. Foster DDR&E
1972
Beginning with the "bomber gap" of the 50' s, Soviet
counterforce potential has been an important issue. The
advent of MIRV technology provided the additional element
numerical advantage to the attacker. Soviet hardware,
such as the SS-18, and Soviet pronouncements have consis-
tently indicated a Russian drive to develop credible
counterforce capability. As Soviet Col V. Larionov states
12

The white-hot culminating point will move to
the beginning period of the war the surprise
mass use of nuclear rocket weapons can bring
utter defeat to an enemy in the shortest time.
Although this paper accepts Soviet counterforce potential
7
as a "given", three counterforce issues are relevant to
discussion of the role of reflexive strategies:
• The military and political (perceptual) value of
counterforce capability.
• The uncertainties regarding real-world counterforce
employment.
• The "side effects" of a counterforce attack.
B. THE POLITICAL UTILITY OF COUNTERFORCE CAPABILITY
Since both we and the Soviet Union are investing
so much of our capability for flexible and
controlled responses in our ICBM forces, these
forces could become tempting targets, assuming
that one or both sides acquire much more sub-
stantial hard-target kill capabilities than
they currently possess. If one side could remove
the other's capability for flexible and control-
led responses, he might find ways of exercising
coercion and extracting concessions without
triggering the final holocaust.
James Schlesinger
1975
For the Soviets, the coercive value of counterforce
capability is not united in its employment ,* but rather in
*There are three principal types of counterforce attack
• An attack designed for damage limiting preceding
a central nuclear war.
o An attack structured to reduce U.S. limited nuclear
option (LNO) forces.
• An attack designed to achieve coercive advantage by
significantly altering the strategic balance. See
Congressional Budget Office, Counterforce Issues for
the U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces (Washington: U.S.
GPO January 1978), p. 5.
13

its political worth; Soviet compellent power is significantly
enhanced as a result of their counterforce potential. Ana-
lysts such as Herman Kahn believe that although a substantial
proportion of the U.S. retaliatory forces would survive a co-
ordinated counterforce attack, it might be possible for the
Soviets to deter a U.S. counterattack. The logic of his
analysis is based on the mathematics associated with the
remaining series counterattacks. As Kahn asserts:
...In this attack,* the attacker would try to destroy
a significant portion of the defender's first-strike
forces and even some of his second-strike forces, but
would avoid as much as possible, civilian targets.
This would make it disadvantageous to the defender
to launch a counterstrike since the defender's
damaged forces might be able to do only a limited
amount of damage even with a countervalue strike,
while the attacker might be able to deliver an
annihilating blow in reprisal with his withheld and
regrouped forces. The defender is also under
pressure to negotiate since it is now probable that
the attacker could threaten another attack, this
one an all-out strike against the rest of the second-
and first-strike forces.^
C. COUNTERFORCE UNCERTAINTIES
The basic problems in any discussion of attacks against
ICBMs is the wide range of uncertainties in the calculation
of success probability. At the lowest level, for example,
is the fact that no one has ever fully tested** an ICBM .
There is no operational (or even R&D experience) with the
*Kahn calls this a " constrained disarming attack ."
**ICBMs have been fired and warheads have been detonated,
but an ICBM with a live warhead has never been test
fired. Additionally the effects of a polar trajectory
are not fully tested.
14

coordination and launching of several hundred ICBMs, and the
immediate and long term nuclear effects of rapid explosion of
over 2000 high yield warheads is not fully understood. These
uncertainties were emphasized during the March 1974 Senate
Foreign Relations Committee Hearings:
Secretary Schlesinger. . . As you know, we have acquired
from the western test range a fairly precise accuracy,
but in the real world we would have to fly from opera-
tional bases to targets in the Soviet Union. The
parameters of the flight from the western test range
are not really very helpful in determining those ac-
curacies to the Soviet Union. We can never know what
degrees of accuracy would be achieved in the real
world.
Senator Symington. . .People get the idea perhaps you
would only kill a hundred people, when actually a tiny
shift would make all the difference. I do not suppose
anything has been more carefully engineered in world
history than the astronaut programs
—
Secretary -Schlesinger. Yes.
Senator Symington (continuing) . And yet, in fact,
they have had many troubles many times; and just a
tiny production error would destroy Kansas City when
an enemy was going after Whiteman, you see. Great
in theory, but in practice, I cannot follow the
thought. 10
Finally, the key issue of fratricide and the associated
critical problems of timing and reprogramming* create con-
siderable question as to the operational feasibility of a
counterforce attack.
These unknowns as well as those in Figure 1 result in a
balancing element of deterrence to the possessor of




UNCERTAINTIES AFFECTING DYNAMIC FiEASURES
OF STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES




—Reliability —Retargeting time •
—Systematic bias error —Support system performance
—Availability —Warhead loadings
--Range —Height of burst on airbursts
2. Uncertain Force Employment Parameters
—Prelaunch survivability —Command-control connectivity
—Penetration probability —Reconnaissance
—Fusing/burst height —Fratricide
3. Uncertain Scenario Conditions
—Warning —Attack timing
—Alert level —Attack objectives
—Scale of attack —Employment of reflexive strategies
4. Uncertain Target Parameters
—Hardness/shielding —Mobility
—Size and shape —Value
—Location —Climate conditions
5. Uncertainties Due to Modelling Deficiencies
—Prompt effects —Radiation level
—Fallout effects —Fratricide
Source:
1973 Proceedings of the National
Security Affairs Conference
(Washington: National Defense




counterforce potential. As Soviet Lieutenant Colonel
V. M. Bonduremko noted:
The combat possibilities of nuclear rocket weapons
which have been studied only under limited condi-
tions of the testing range, in the opinion of many
specialists are really not known to this day and
this causes difficulties in determining the organi-
zational form of army structure. * '^
D. SIDE EFFECTS OF COUNTERFORCE ATTACKS
Unfortunately, many dispassionate, analytical discussions
of postulated Soviet counterforce attacks attempt to project
an image of ICBM counterforce as a surgical disarming attack.
A cursory review of the map of U.S. counterforce targets
provides a different image. Not only are key U.S. targets
located near population centers, but they also virtually
cover the entire country. The argument is not against the
military value of counterforce weapons, but rather against
an unrealistic vision of the results of such an attack. As
Barry Carter states:
Finally, some U.S. retaliation would seem very likely
to the Russian leadership since tens of millions of
Americans would be killed in any "Minuteman only"
attack. In attacks against silos the bombs are set
to explode as close to the ground as possible,
thereby picking up much dirt and debris. The fall-
out from the explosion of thousands of megatons * of
nuclear weapons over the Minuteman fields would be
tremendous, and winds would carry lethal contamina-
tion over many major U.S. cities. Such calculations
of fallout do not even include the possibility of
a few Russian warheads going off source and directly
hitting populated areas, not the collateral damage
by Russian attacks against other targets, such as



















































































Herman Kahn drew a similar conclusion:
...neither side might want to hit many, or any large
cities early in the war. .. .However , if there are a
number of missiles fired at strategic bases it is
more than likely that some will go astray; these
could easily strike heavily and disastrously popu-
lated areas. 14
Sidney Drell and Frank von Hippel quantified these "side
effects" of a Soviet counterforce attack:
The Defense Department's response of July 1975
presented new casualty figures... A heavier strike
with two three-megaton warheads, one a surface
burst and the other an airburst, directed at each
silo would cause 18.3 million fatalities . . .A "com-
prehensive" attack with two one-magaton surface
bursts on each ICBM silo and strikes against the
46 Strategic Air Command (SAC) bases and the two
bases for ballistic-missile submarines, would
cause 16.3 million fatalities. ... 15
The problem of analyzing the potential vulnerability of
U.S. land-based ICBMs is a formidable one. It is a complex
interacting mixture of force potential, technical uncertain-
ties and most significantly, political goals and perceptions.
John Steinbruner and Thomas M. Garwin summarized the problem
as follows:
...the beginning of wisdom on this issue is to be
found in realization of the inevitability of igno-
rance and in acceptance of its consequences; that
on the basis of technical information available
—
at whatever level of privileged access—calculations
of vulnerability are indeterminate; that categorical
assertions about vulnerability, which are frequently
found in current political discourse, rest upon
tacit assumptions more than technical fact; and, that
the usual assumptions are not the only ones which
ought to be made. More succinctly stated, vulnera-
bility of the land-based missile forces, to para-
phrase Wolfgand Panofsky, is far more a state of
mind than a physical conditions, but, nevertheless,
19

it is an extremely important state of mind^ worthy






1. Launch on Warning (LOW)
Most treatments of the subject of reflexive launch
strategies center on launch on warning (LOW) . This focus
on LOW is based on its historical relevance as the original
conceptualization of a reactive launch strategy, and the
fact that all other such atrategies are essentially deriva-
tives of LOW. The problem with LOW is that it is an impre-
cise, ambiguous term (i.e., what constitutes warning and
what is the character of the response?) . The problem,
however, goes well beyond "squishy" sematics: the critical
ambiguity is in the warning , not the words.
LOW is defined as "a launch in response to sensor
indication of an attack on the continental United States
17
. .(CONUS) " and is essentially an extension of a traditional
policy of launching strategic bomber forces on receipt of
attack warning. The obvious difference is that while bombers
are recallable, current U.S. strategic missiles are not.
Irrevocability is a feature of all existing ICBM launch
strategies, but it is most significant in the LOW scenarios.
Although the definition of "warning" may be modified by
political and technical factors, LOW is hierarchically a
21

a decision made with the minimum acceptable level of informa-
tion; it is coincidentally a decision of potentially apocalyptic
proportion. What makes LOW problematical is not only the myriad
of associated technical issues, but also this "gut level"
paradox of making a decision of the greatest import with the
lowest (hierarchical) level of information (and ergo, confi-
dence) . In its simplest form, LOW could be considered a pre-
emptive attack (e.g., "warning" being a small launch or even
an aggressive force reposturing within the context of a crisis
level political scenario) or an unintentional and premature
escalation.
2. Launch Under Attack (LUA)
LUA is similar to the previously described LOW, but
differs in two major respects. First, attack is defined as
a massive assault on value and/or force. Second, the
criterion for attack existence is a multiphenomenological
(i.e., sensors, scenarios, intelligence) unambiguous corre-
lation of information. The key to the LUA concept is the
existence of several independent but corroborative indicators
of a massive attack in progress. For example, the U.S.
currently has four major systems for detecting strategic
attack: early warning satellites; the Ballistic Missile
Early Warning (BMEWS) network; PAVE PAWS (SLBM warning radar)
;
and the Safeguard-developed Perimeter Acquisition Radar (PAR)
18
at Grand Forks, North Dakota. The idea is that sequential
22

and mutually substantiating attack reports will come from
these four independent warning systems.
Additionally, the origin, size, and general target
area can be pieced together from these progress reports:
Thus, if a large attack were made against our
land-based missiles, the satellite detection
system would count the attack, provide its
approximate target area, and determine when
the attacking missiles would be seen by BMEWS
radars in Alaska and Greenland. Approximately
ten minutes later these radars would observe
the missile re-entry vehicles (at the time that
the satellite system forecasted) , verify the
size of the attack and its likely targets, and
predict when the PAR radar in North Dakota would
see the attack. Finallly, again at the expected
time, the PAR radars would verify information
previously provided by the other sensors and
determine, precisely what targets were being
attacked. -^^
3. Launch Under Attack Assessment (LUAA)
This mode is virtually identical to the above described
LUA. LUAA is in fact a politically motivated redefinition of
LUA. The implication of LUAA is two-fold. First, it implies
considered analysis of the existence of an attack (and im-
plicitly the choice of response) and, secondly, it includes
the ability to carefully define attack size, target (s) and
origin. SAC Commander Gen. Richard Ellis, however, has serious
reservations about the time and technical capability available
to make LUAA (as opposed to LUA) a reality. According to
General Ellis, "time is equally crucial for attack assessment















Source: A. Hall, "The Case for an Improved ICBM,"
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not accurately assess an ICBM/SLBM attack under all conditions
20because the time is inadequate."
Proponents of LUAA attempt to project an image of
"lightning fast" computer analysis of multiple inputs coupled
to an instantly reprogrammable highly responsive attack force
controlled by an inhibiting Presidential (NCA) permissive
action link (PAL) . The argument becomes significantly more
compelling if the "bolt out of the blue" surprise attack is
discounted. The effectiveness and credibility of any military
response cannot be separated from the total political-military
situation.
The argument is that "rational" strategic attacks would
have telegraphed precursors far in excess of infra-red signa-
tures and radar blips. Those who postulate a real possibility
of a Soviet strategic attack must see its reality coupled not
only to war aims, but also to extensive (visible) military and
civil defense mobilization. What emerges is essentially a
paradox of time. Those who build a case for Soviet strategy
based on counterforce, warfighting and damage limiting, state
with equal assurance that reflexive launch strategies are not
feasible due to the paucity of response time (10 minutes for
SLBM attack; 20 minutes for ICBM attack) . What they fail
to explain is how the Soviet Union can disperse its people,
shelter key cadres, batten down critical industries, destroy
western satellites and intelligence sources, mobilize troops
on the western and southern flanks and scramble air defenses
26

all within less than one hour and all without alerting the
United States.
Essentially, current technical limitations and ulti-
mately finite human limits make a literally defined launch-
under-assessment (emphasis on assessment) in response to an
irrational surprise (to both sides) attack improbable. This
type of attack favors analysis such as William Schneider's:
The 'launch on assessment' concept is obviously
fraught with uncertainties and risk
—
particu-
larly the risk of accidental conflict—and
there is little indication that it is considered
seriously within the U.S. Administration. Never-
theless, it does represent one conceivable answer
to the problem of Minuteman vulnerability—albeit
a dangerous answer.
However, for other scenarios, encompassing deteriorating poli-
tical relations and/or escalating military attacks/preparations,
the LUAA concept becomes technically more feasible and poli-
tically more credible.
4. Launch on Impact (LOI) or Launch Through Attack (LTA)
LOI assumes that reflexive launch would not take place
until actual nuclear detonation (s) occur in or above the target
area. On the surface LOI appears to be the most attractive
reflexive strategy due to its greater uncertainty that missiles
are only fired in response to a " real " attack; but LOI (some-
times known as Launch Through Attack) entails severe concep-
tual and technical problems. Although it takes about twenty
minutes to attack a Minuteman field due to fratricide effects,
the same effect acts to limit launch during or through an
27

attack. (ICBM's would be vulnerable to blast and radiation
22
during boost phase J The distance between northern and
southern Minuteman silos equates to an approximate 5 minute
23
warning advantage for the southern targets. However, a
strategy depending on impact for assurance could easily be
negated by the use of simultaneous arrival times (on northern
and southern fields) instead of a simultaneous launch of the
initial attacking forces. This tactic augmented by use of
SLBM's for pin down* and/or attacks on the National Command
Authority (NCA) could thwart a true LOI or Launch Through
Attack strategy. In fact when viewed within the range of
strategies LOI is the most demanding reflexive response since
24
it required infoirmation (e.g. , sensor detection or human
report of detonation) and commitment (to launch) in the most
demanding trans-attack period. LOW and LUA permit attack
3
with the full C I and retaliatory force intact; Launch-After-
Attack (LAA) allows for some assessment of the force status
and the nature of the total attack; LOI conversely provides
3
neither the pre-attack C I force integrity of LOW/LUA nor the
considered situation assessment of LAA.
5. Launch After Attack
As defined here. Launch after Attack (LAA) is a re-
flexive response that could be employed in two cases. The
first would be an immediate launch of all ICBM' s remaining
after a partially successful first wave counterforce attack.




to an attack on government, economic or military targets.
This second case is predicated on having survivable forces
(e.g./ MX), but vulnerable centers of political, economic
and military power. The concept in this scenario is not a
launch to protect strategic forces (or a deterrent threat
of such a response to counterforce attack) , but rather a
sure (virtually automatic) and immediate retaliation that
is not dependent on survival of the NCA or even the entire
Washington Politico-Military establishment. LAA differs
from other reflexive launch strategies in that, unlike the
others that play both deterrent and defensive roles (pro-
tection of the missiles) , LAA is principally a deterrent
posture. It removes any doubt (however limited) that a
successful massive attack on U.S. centers of government,
military and economic power would so cripple the country
that a retaliatory attack might appear counter-productive.
6. Flush on Warning (FOW) Modes : Delayed Arm Commit
and Launch into Holding
Flush on Warning reflexive strategies differ from
the above described attack modes in two primary aspects:
• FOW ICBMs are not committed to destroying enemy
targets at launch.
• Because FOW forces are not committed, they can be
launched earlier and with less information about
the nature and origin of the attack.
Two general FOW concepts have been suggested, neither
of which has been developed or deployed. These FOW categories
are Delayed Arm Commit and Launch Into Holding.
29

a. Delayed Arm Commit
This concept, as described by Richard L. Garwin,
involves employment of a secure, jam-resistant command link
to arm or disarm a missile in flight. Garwin urges a further
hedge by launching no more than 50 percent of the force. Two
primary advantages derive from a system with an inflight arm
command capability:
• A time advantage of approximately 15 additional
minutes to commit to target destruction. This
time advantage is, however, more than just 15
minutes of assessment and decision process time:
these 15 minutes roughly equate to the flight
time of an SLBM pin down of C-^ attack. Addi-
tionally, these 15 minutes allow for the occur-
rence of unambiguous nuclear detonation (in the
Minuteman fields or elsewhere) prior to an ir-
revocable U.S. commitment to nuclear attack.
In other words, this system allows the advan-
tages of both Launch on Warning (fast reaction)
and the other extreme of Launch on Impact
(greatest certainty)
.
• The inclusion of an additional safety link in
the attack system (the command arm link) . This
safety link provides an important spin-off by
permitting development of a more highly respon-
sive attack assessment NCA launch system.
This system, when tied to an operational policy of launching
only a fraction of the force, would also eliminate the problem
of an accidental launch that is subsequently not armed but
effectively disarms the U.S. by emptying all the Minuteman
and Titan silos.
The delayed arm commit system, though neat
theoretically, is fraught with serious pragmatic problems.
Regardless of the myriad arguments concerning time factors.
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deterrence, targeting, etc., the key fallacy in the logic
of this approach is the requirement for a 100 percent re-
liable arm/disarm command link to the missiles.
If the arm inflight mode is chosen, then there
is the possibility of system failure or military vulnera-
. .
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bility. The alternative of the option to disarm in flight
is even more problematic; for if it is needed to redress
an inadvertent launch, then it must be failsafe (i.e., all
missiles must respond to the disarm signal) . As has been
shown by nuclear power plants and other exhibits of state-
of-the-art technology, "fail safe" systems are politically
public perceptions) , if not technically, impossible to
construct.
b. Launch into Holding
Launch into holding systems differ from the
above Delayed Arm Commit concepts in two ways:
• The decision time is significantly expanded
allowing earlier launch (by lower echelon
authority) and protracted attack assessment
and force commitment time.
• The weapons may be totally or partially re -
covered and in some systems, reused (after
refurbishment) in the event of an inadver-
tent or excessive force launch.
Two such systems have been recently proposed for technical
analysis and possible deployment to supplement the MX
2 6




c. Launch (On Warning) Into Orbit (LIO)
This system involves modification of Minuteman
II or III to provide increased boost thrust, a variable
thrust, restartable upper stage, enhanced navigation system
and a secure jam-proof communications link. Under this
concept, on initial Defense Support Satellite warning, a
portion of the force would be launched into parking orbits
to await release by the NCA or a recall order. Orbital
mechanics and velocity correction could allow for inflight
target selection or reprograraming. Key to this system is
a network of ground stations used for communications and
27guidance update to the missiles.
It is this reliance on ground communication and
the added complexity that, in addition to political problems,
are the main deficiencies of the system. Among the princi-
pal advantages of standard ICBMs are autonomy after launch
and relative simplicity of operation. Autonomy eliminates
the need for vulnerable ground links while simplicity of
operation enhances reliability. Under optimum conditions,
maintaining coordinated control of one hundred or more
orbiting missiles would be a formidable task; perforroing
this task during/after a massive Soviet attack becomes
questionable. Additionally, these warheads would be vulnera-




d. Cruise Ballistic Missile (CBM)
The concept involves a hybrid vehicle consisting
of a huge (90 foot wingspan) cruise missile tied to a
Minuteman III ICBM. On warning, this combined vehicle would
be cold-launched, boosted to about 20,000 feet and then
loiter in the aerodynamic cruise mode awaiting orders from
the NCA. The vehicle could remain aloft for extended
periods, land to be refueled or on coramand launch its
2 8Minuteman III. This system faces the same technical draw-
backs as the Launch Into Orbit system but has the added
hazard of live warheads cruising over the United States in
unmanned vehicles. It can be argued that in a nuclear war
political problems of unmanned nuclear vehicles are not a
consideration and that the risk of crash and/or compromise
are acceptable in an actual war. However, an unresolved
paradox is present in this logic: If the risk is acceptable
because the system is only used in an actual nuclear war,
then why is it needed at all? Why not just employ LUA/LUAA?
B. REFLEXIVE MODE COMPARISON
The preceding RLS definitions are significant to any
examination of this issue. The convention in strategic
literature to characterize all reflexive launch strategies
as "Launch on Warning" is deceptive. It is easy to dismiss
the employment of any reflexive option under any circum-
stance if all are characterized as automatic, instantaneous
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and complete counter-value spasms released in response to
a "bolt out of the blue" signal from a single early warning
satellite. However, if the scenario is redefined, a different
conclusion is apparent. If the reflexive response is a
surgical, counter-military attack and is launched during
a crisis (e.g. , the beginning of a Warsaw Pact invasion
of Western Europe) in response to sequential, corroborative
warning indications culminating with precise PAR indication





Although this paper owing to classification and scope
cannot present an indepth analysis of all technical issues
pertinent to Reflexive Strategies, it is necessary to examine
the principal technical elements that preclude or enhance
the employment of reflexive postures. Two topic areas are
of primary concern in assessing the impact of technical
issues:
• Operational Requirements - Those things that are
needed to construct a credible RLS system.
• Technical Advances that have changed assumptions
regarding and requirements for RLS systems.
A. OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS
...timely and reliable warning and assessment of an
attack is essential to our offensive forces. Such
warning and assessment increase the survivability of
our retaliatory and C-^ resources and add credibility
to our statements that the Soviets cannot count on
finding our increasingly vulnerable ICBM's still in




To have a viable capability for reflexive commitment, Richard
Garwin has stipulated that a force have the following elements
• A sensor or set of sensors adequate to detect the
launching of the potentially disarming attack and
to assess its severity, and sufficiently reliable




• The communications means to connect the sensors to
the decision-making authority for the United States,
(the "NCA," or National Command Authority).
• Time to establish that a disarming strike had been
launched by the other side.
• People, equipment, and procedures to use the communi-
cated sensor information to authorize the launch of
a portion of the U.S. ICBM force, against an appro-
priate target set and with some choice of warhead
arming—irrevocable, command-arm or command-disarm.
• The communications means to carry this decision to
the force to be launched.
• Sufficiently rapid fly-out of the launch-under-attack
missiles, so that they are not caught in or near their
silos after receipt of the order to launch.
• System components sufficiently robust so that the
launch-under-attack capability cannot be denied the
United States by the expenditure of resources very
much less than those required to destroy the ICBM
silos (unless those measures are unambiguous and 20
themselves such as to cause launch of the ICBM force)
.
Critics of the practicality of employing an RLS doctrine state,
essentially, that each of the above listed requirements repre-
sents a potential weak link in the chain, that there are un-
resolved technical and "operational" (i.e., man in the loop)
questions, and that there is too little time available to
provide assurance that each of these requirements could be
satisfied. The statement of William Graham and Paul Nitze
exemplifies these technical reservations:
The survivability of our land-based missile force
under a launch-on-warning concept would require
that our early warning systems had not been
neutralized, and would be totally dependent upon
the high reliability of our warning systems to
detect and comprehend an actual attack, whatever
action the attacker chose to take. At the same
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time, exceptionally reliable interpretation and
rejection of erroneous information indicating
that an attack was underway would be essential.
Both of these requirements, as well as the problems
of avoiding pin-down and of maintaining continuity
and nearly instantaneous response in the chain of
command in the face of a carefully coordinated
attack, pose extremely formidable technological
and other difficulties, ^1
A key question of technical capability is the vulnerability
of the warning systems themselves.
Early-warning satellites (which contain infrared
sensors, visible light detectors and particle and
radiation sensors) might be blinded or attacked:
Would such action be judged to be the equivalent
of early warning or a missile attack? Simultan-
eously, one or more of the three Ballistic Missile
Early Warning System (BMEWS) facilities could be
destroyed. . . . ^^
Colin Gray's statement is supported by Deputy Under Secretary
of Defense Zeiberg's statement that "While we continue to
maintain the capability to launch our ICBM force on warning
of an attack we cannot rely on such an option since it lacks
the stability required in a crisis and depends on warning
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systems which may themselves be vulnerable." Gray's
further analysis that an attack of the DSP satellites and
one of the BMEWS radar would leave "...the United States
with no * reliable early warning capabilities vis-a-vis
the principle missile threat window" is, at the least,
hyperbole. This frequent criticism of the viability of
*Emphasis added—this statement ignores the PAR system.
While PAR does not provide the early warning margin of the
DSP satellite , it does provide time-sufficient attack analysis,
Early warning, however, would be provided by aggressive
destruction of the DSP and/or the BMEWS: Explosive destruc-
tion of BMEWS provides a far less ambiguous indication of
potential attack then blips on a radar scope.
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substantial effort is being expended in diversifying, moder-
nizing Reflexive Launch concepts ignores two major considera-
tions. First, the U.S. Warning network consists of more
than the Defense Support Satellites and BMEWS radars.
Additionally, substantial effort is being expended in diversi-
fying, modernizing, expanding and hardening the United States'
strategic surveillance and warning system:
We have begun a number of efforts aimed at enhancing
the survivability of our missile attack warning
systems and improving the quality of attack assess-
ment information supporting NCA response option
selection (including maintaining the option of a
Presidential decision to launch our missiles when
they are under attack) . We are planning both near-
term and long-term improvements in the early warning
satellite system, for early warning of ICBM and SLBM
attacks. Evolutionary improvements to increase
the survivability and capability of the satellite
systems continue to be incorporated during the
production cycle for replacement satellites.
Our ground-based radar systems would confirm satel-
lite warning of ICBM or SLBM attacks. For the
northern approaches, we depend on the Ballistic
Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) radars at
sites in Greenland, Alaska, and England to confirm
an ICBM attack. Programmed improvements of the
Greenland BMEWS radars, which view the missile
approaches to central CONUS , will produce better
estimates of attack size and impact points that
should be sufficient to verify an attack on our
MINUTEMAN force. We also plan to complete the
replacement of obsolete computers at all three
BMEWS sites. The Perimeter Acquisition Radar
Characterization System (PARCS) , a converted ABM
radar, will act as a backup for BMEWS coverage
of ICBM attacks against central CONUS until the
BMEWS improvements are completed. The PARCS is
being upgraded to provide more timely and accurate
impact point prediction for a larger number of RVs.
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Ground-based surveillance radars along our coasts
would confirm satellite warning of an SLBM attack.
Two new PAVE PAWS phased-array radars will replace
all but one of the FSS-7 SLBM warning radars. PAVE
PAWS radars provide improved coverage along the
east and west coasts. In addition to PAVE PAWS,
we will continue to operate the older FPS-85 phased-
array radar and one FSS-7 in Florida to cover possi-
ble SLBM launch areas southeast of the United
States. 35
The second major problem with RLS critiques that center
on warning systems vulnerability is that these arguments
are too narrow in focus. These discussions do not present
a complete scenario including the state of the East/West
political-military relationship. If a crisis developed
and/or if we noted Soviet civil defense and military mobi-
lization combined with aircraft dispersal and increased
Soviet Naval SSBN and surface combatant deployment levels,
and if all of this was followed by "mysterious" loss of
one or more of our DSP satellites, then it is difficult to
argue that we have "lost our early warning capabilities."
B
. COMimi^ICATIONS
Reservations regarding the ability to maintain
communications between the NCA and the strategic forces
equal those concerning warning system vulnerability. SAC
Commander General Ellis has said: "Whether communications
can be maintained through this trans-attack period is
problematical. We know how to restore communications after
the trans-attack period, but this takes time. Minuteman































LOW 1 1 3 1 1 1
LUA 2 2 2 2 2 2
LUAA 2 2 2 2 2 2
LOI 3 3 1 3 1 3
LAA^ 4 4 4 4 2 4
DAC 3 2 3 1 1 2
LIO 4 3 3 1 1 3
CBM 4 4 3 1 1 3
Note : Numbers 1 through 4 indicate relative
capabilitv of fulfillins requireinents
1 indicates least capable




LOI - Launch-On- Impact
LAA - Launch-After-Attack
DAC - Delayed Arm Commit
LIO - Launch (On Warning)- into-Orbit
CBM - Cruise Ballistic Missile
TDecision time prior to commitment to attack (not launch)
2LAA is defined as a launch of surviving forces (or survivable forces)
immediately following an initial attack
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Dr. Harold Brown supports this analysis:
3Our deterrence strategy requires that strategic C
should be capable not only of supporting assured
retaliation after an initial surprise attack, but
also of managing our strategic reserve forces
throughout a protracted nuclear war. The surviva-
bility, flexibility and endurance of these C-^
systems should be at least comparable to that of
our strategic forces. They should be capable of
operating in environments disrupted by electro-
magnetic, nuclear and chemical/biological effects.
At present, our ability to meet these objectives
falls considerably short. ^^
These current deficiencies have a much greater deleterious
effect on post-attack retaliation or Launch Through Attack/
Launch on Impact policies than on Launch on Warning.
Additionally, there are no serious technical barriers to
3hardening the present C system. As Dr. Brown states:
The land-based ICBM' s are becoming increasingly vul-
nerable and tactical warning is as a consequence,
increasingly important to the mission accomplish-
ment of this leg of the TRIAD. Our programs will
reduce the vulnerability of our strategic communi-
cations to physical attack, jamming and nuclear
effects. ^^
C. TECHNICAL ADVANCES
"The flight testing by the Soviets in 1977 of an
improved post-boost guidance and control system
for the SS-18 MOD 4 suggests that the Soviets are
capable of deploying ICBM-based re-entry vehicles
with a yield and accuracy combination sufficient
to destroy the hardest Minuteman silo or its
associated Launch Control Center."^
"Our warning systems have progressed considerably
further. U.S. satellite systems can now detect
the launch of Soviet ICBM' s and estimate their









90X CONFIDENCE INTERVAL ''^
FOR EFFECTS OF UNCERTAINTIES
(yield, ccp md liliability)
1978 1980 1982 1984
YEAR
1986 1988
Source: DOD Annual Report FY 1980
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The above quotations illuminate the two major technical
advances that have increased the requirement for, and altered
assumptions regarding Reflexive Launch Strategies.
1. Accuracy
As described in the threat section, significant
accuracy improvements have increased the vulnerability of
U.S. ICBM forces and proportionately increased the desira-
bility of countervailing reflexive launch strategies.
Additionally, significant U.S. accuracy and reliability im-
provements, achieved with the MM III, the Mark 12A reentry
vehicle, the improved target modeling program, and the high
41
speed retargeting system (Command Data Buffer) , have made
Reflexive options more credible. Accuracy and reliability
enable adoption of a countermilitary targeting policy for
missiles launched during an attack. This not only insures
highest use of land-based assets, but also avoids uninten-
tional countervalue escalation (i.e., "city busting") and
mitigates the consequences of an excessively lethal reflex-
ive response to a limited, inadvertent/" accidental" Soviet
counterforce attack (Hammurabi rules apply)
.
2. Potential for Secure Inflight Command Arming for RLS
ICBMs
Unlike other technical advances (e.g., warning satel-
lites) that have modified the assumptions about RLS viability,
the existing technology to construct a secure inflight command
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arm system has significantly altered the capabilities of RLS
systems. During the 1970 ABM Congressional debate, this
alternative was discussed by Paul Wolfowitz, who discounted
the idea on technical and conceptual grounds:
Disarming our missiles in flight ; Senator Gore,
during a March 26 hearing, suggested that we
might arrange some signal for disarming our
missiles in flight, and "if it were discovered
that an error had been made then the MINUTEMEN
themselves could not be continued on their
missions." This creates the problem that an
enemy might discover the signal to disarm our
missiles and use it; more important, there
would be disasterous consequences, including
possibly nuclear war, if one or two signals
failed to get through after an accident launch.
Arming our missiles in flight : An earlier
suggestion (by Senator Symington, in a hearing
March 21) that we might launch our ICBMs "without
arming them and arm them in the air," presents
other difficulties. i) If our missiles were
launched in a false alarm—even one deliberately
triggered by an enemy—or if communications to
them were blacked out in an attack, then we
would be effectively disarmed. ii) If we could
not convince the Russians that our missiles,
launched by accident, were unarmed, the result
might be nuclear war
—
particularly if they also
followed a "launch on warning" policy. ^2
Technical evolution since 1970 has changed some of the
assumptions in the above argument; as Dr. Garwin has stated:
...encryption algorithms and hardware exist now
in abundance so that it can be made entirely im-
possible for any individual or nation to mimic
the arming or disarming signal without actually
capturing that signal. Furthermore, even one
use of the signal for arming or disarming a
portion of the Minuteman force can be arranged
not to reveal a signal useful for another portion
of the force or for use at a later time. Finally,
given the survival of the assumed ground-based,
mobile, powerful radio transmitters and the
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special ("anti-jam") characteristics available
to the communicator who needs to communicate
reliably only a single "yes-no" decision, it
can be made entirely infeasible for the Soviet
Union to deny the accurate reception of such a
signal. ^^
Such a secure communications system is similar to that
conceived for a Launch Into Orbit RLS system:
...downlink jamming would be difficult because
the jammer would have to be within 30 miles of
the missile. The downlink pulse would have a
unique signature of 1000 bits, further limiting
jamming all communications without the anti-
jamming pattern would be ignored. ^^
Contemporary electronic encryption and antijara techniques
combined with dispersed mobile transmitters make feasible
construction of a credible inflight Command Arm/Disarm
system. Additionally, a policy of launching only a limited
portion of the force would preclude the possibility of in-
advertently (false alarm) disarming ourselves or being
disarmed by a deliberate/inadvertent Russian feint.
The above technical and operational solution still
leaves two major problems unresolved.
• A launch armed, command disairm inflight system
would have to be not only technically feasible,
but also operationally 100% fail-safe to be of
advantage over LUA/LUAA. (All missiles would
have to respond to a disarm signal.) Although,
as stated earlier, such a system coupled to
"surgical" counter-military targeting would be
safer than a pure (irrevocably armed) LUA/LUAA
system, the possibility of inadvertent detona-
tion of even one set of
_3 Minuteman III warheads
presents a formidable risk.
45

If the idea of a Coiranand Arm/Disarm system is to
allow for attack assessment error and/or faster
response than the problem becomes as, Dr. Wolfowitz
states: How do we convince the Soviets that the
300 or so incoming Mark 12 reentry vehicles are
not armed? What if the Russians also rely on LOW
or LUA?* If we believe that the Russians would
accept assurances (particularly during a crisis)
that incoming warheads are not armed, then how
could we believe that the United States would
Launch Under Attack if the Russians gave u£
similar assurances? The Inflight Command Arm
System (a concept designed to allow for "balks")
presents as many new problems, complication and
uncertainties as it attempts to resolve.
D. ALTERNATIVES TO REFLEXIVE STRATEGIES
The value of adoption of a reflexive launch strategy must
be examined within the context of existing or potential al-
ternatives. In addition to reflexive launch strategies,
three major possibilities exist for resolving the impending
vulnerability of land-based ICBMs.
• Develop a survivably based follow-on land-based ICBM
system (e.g. , canisterizing Minuteman III for deploy-
ment in vertical multiple protective shelters, and/or
MX) .
• Adopt a Dyad strategy employing bombers/ALCM carriers
and SLBMs.**
• Develop an ICBM active defensive system (i.e., ABM).
Technical evolution has altered the capabilities of potential
system alternatives and attendant assumptions regarding their
utility.
*The USSR has 70% of its total throw weight and 75% of its
total (6000) warheads in fixed land base ICBMs that represent
56% of their total Bomber/Missile launch force. Source: DOD
FY81 Annual Report.
**SLBM is used here to include both existing Trident/Poseidon





1. Survivably Based ICBM
In assessing the relative utility of employing the
Minuteman system in an RLS posture as a solution to force
vulnerability, the value of the basic weapon must be con-
sidered. An examination of the issues reveals that a replace-
ment for Minuteman is desirable for reasons beyond pre-launch
vulnerability.
In addition to the need for survivable basing, a
new ICBM system is required for two main reasons:
• Military Capability - Increased throw-weight and
accuracy are required to provide time urgent hard
target kill potential (counterforce/countermilitary) ,
• Force Modernization - Minuteman 1 was first flown
in February 1, 1961; Minuteman 2 achieved initial
operational capability (IOC) in 1965 and Minuteman 3
IOC was 1970.^^ Force modernization is necessary
not only to replace aging equipment that is in-
creasingly more difficult to support, but also to
take advantage of advanced in state-of-the-art
reliability, maintainability, and total system
operational effectiveness.
Any discussion of the use of pre-impact RLS as a
"cost effective" alternative to a survivably based MX must
include consideration of the fact that the Minuteman system
is a 1960 's era system facing a mid-1980 's mission and
threat.
*
2. SLBM and Bomber/ALCM Dyad
An obvious "solution" to the problems of Minuteman/
vulnerability is to eliminate the target and shift forces











ABILITY TO REPUCATE THE CAPABILITIES OF
THE ALTERNATIVE SYSTEM (e.g. MX CAN BE
USED IN AN RLS MODE)
CERTAINTY IN REDUCING ICBM VULNERABILITY
EMPLOYMENT FLEXIBILITY (i.e. TIMING, ETC.)
MILITARY CAPABILITY: GROSS THROW WEIGHT,
ACCURACY, RELIABILITY, EMT
SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF FORCE MODERN-
IZATION (i.e. MINUTEMAN SERVICE LIFE;
EMPLOYMENT OF STATE OF THE ART MILITARY
CAPABILITY, RELIABILITY, AND OPERATING
COSTS)
CRISIS STABILITY/INCENTIVE TO PRE-EMPT - +
DEMAND ON C"^ - +
DEMAND ON WARNING NETWORK - +
DECISION TIME - +
VULNERABILITY TO PIN-DOWN* - +
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CERTAINTY IN THE DECISION TO ATTACK - +
SAFETY/FREEDOM FROM MISCALCULATION OR
ACCIDENTAL LAUNCH
- +
TOTAL FORCE AVAILABILITY FOR LAA - +
ADVERSARY AND ALLIED PERCEPTION OF NATIONAL
POWER AND WILL
- +
AGGREGATE MILITARY CAPABILITY AND
DETERRENT CREDIBILITY
- +
NOTE: Signs C+ and -] indicate the
comparative capability of the two
systems. Although + is assigned
to the superior system regardless
of the degree of advantage, in
most cases the marginal advantage
is significant.
*Although MX is vulnerable to pin-down, this vulnerability
does not effect its employment after an attack. Pin-down
is normally conceived of in the context of "pin-down and
destroy", however, it could be used to prevent (temporarily )
employment of MX counter- military or counter-silo capability.
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to a bomber/ALCM and SLBM dyad. Such a decision would have
to consider both the survivability (existing and potential)
of land-based ICBMs as well as their offensive capability.
Assumption of a dyad strategic posture could occur in two
ways:
• Phasing out land-based ICBM' s (possibly substitut-
ing air launched or sea-based alternative systems)
.
• Taking no action and allowing land-based ICBMs to
become increasingly more vulnerable.*
The effect of either of these approaches produces the same
result—a loss of both perceived and actual military capa-
bility. Although the unique capabilities of ICBMs are
detailed in Figure 8, one area deserves specific attention.
Of greatest significance in any consideration of the value
of land-based missiles is their synergistic role within the
Triad. Because ICBMs. have a distinct survivability mechanism,
they—by complicating the Soviet's R&D and operational systems
efforts—increase the survivability of the other two legs.
As Colin Gray has stated:
Soviet leaders might come to believe that a
counter-force first strike on a United States
with a dyad would stand a reasonable chance of
achieving a clear political victory. (It is
not implied that the Soviet Union would seriously
aspire to effect a total counter-force strike
—
only that Soviet bargaining strength for intrawar
deterrence should be very great indeed after a
surprise attack on an American dyad of SSBN and
manned bombers.) Soviet leaders would, of course,
need to calculate that the United States would
*This approach could be based on one of two theories:
(a) the threat to land-based ICBMs is theoretical , but not
actual; (b) ICBMs act as a diversion or "sponge" for large
numbers of Soviet missiles. Both of these arguments are
weakened by their reliance on unsubstantiated assumptions.
Additionally, this alternative would undermine the percep-







- survival mode is different than SLBMs or bombers
. ENDURANCE
- the ability to indefinitely maintain the highest
state of pre-conflict readiness
. ENDURING SURVIVABILITY/AVAILABILITY
- the ability to be selectively witheld or employed
throughout protracted conflict. i/
• ACCURACY
- provides hard target kill capability and attack
of select targets with minimal megatonnage and low
collateral damage
. C^ SIMPLICITY, RELIABILITY AND REDUNDANCE
. HIGH THROW WEIGHT
- large payload allows for multiple, hard target
capable warheads and penetration aids
. HIGH OPERATIONAL RELIABILITY
- missiles are: stored in a benign pre-launch environ-
ment; supported by extensive ground test equipment;
continually accessible for maintenance; and fired
under stable controlled, conditions
. HIGH ALERT RATE/FORCE AVAILABILITY
- at any time, virtually the entire force is available
for launch
. CAPABLE OF COMPLEX, COORDINATED ATTACKS AND HIGH SPEED
RETARGETING
- provides effective counter force/counter military
potential.
. LOW OPERATING COST




Sovereign basing provides three advantages:
peace time security and safety; freedom from
dependence on neutral or foreign operating
and basing areas; an attack on the force is




- provides increased survivability for bombers-
Source: Author's assessment--see also: The FY 1981
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ICBMs are not susceptible to attrition during conven-
tional conflict; they don't require refueling or replenish-
ment and are not exposed to attack by a need for periodic
return to vulnerable bases (as is the case for FBM submarines
and strategic bombers)
.
2An SLBM attack on bomber bases would give adequate
warning of an imminent attack on ICBMs; conversely, an ICBM
attack on Minuteman launched to arrive simultaneously with
an SLBM attack would provide adequate warning for the bombers.
See- -statement of Jan M. Lodal , in Hearings before the Committee
on Foreign Relations United States Senate Ninety-Fifth Congres"s~
First Session 14, 19 January and 16 March 1977, ("United States/





cooperate and choose to be deterred in such a
situation; however, they could aim to achieve
a nuclear Pearl Harbor against the 40 percent
or more of the Poseidon-Trident fleet that is
always in its home ports or at forward bases
(Holy Loch and Guam) and hope to catch a large
fraction of the B52/FB-111A force before it could
reach its safe escape points , thus leaving the
United States Government in a terrible dilemma. ^^
The essence of the argument favoring land-based ICBMs
is not that they are inherently invulnerable, but that they
possess vulnerabilities different from those of bombers/
ALCM and SSBNs. This difference assures that all three
systems cannot be nullified by concentration on a single
technological defense solution. Additionally, ICBMs provide
unique military capabilities such as secure C3 , high alert
rate, and superior operational accuracy.
3. Advanced Sea-Based Alternatives
Technological evolution promises to alleviate three
of the major comparative deficiencies of SLBMs
:
• Range/throw-weight - Trident I (C4) and Trident
II (D-5) if developed) vastly increase the range
of SLBMs. 4^
• Accuracy-Trident I (C-4) has significant accuracy
improvement and the MK500 MARV (under development)
has the potential to provide SLBMs with counter-
force capability. 4 8
• C3 - Construction of the Extremely Low Frequency
(ELF) communication systems would improve surviva-
bility by not forcing Trident subs to trail antennae
or operate near the surface. Additionally, advanced
communications systems such as satellite-laser
systems could enhance SSBNC3.'^^ The problem is that
neither of these complementary SSBN communications
systems presently exist nor are they in the budget:
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Serious political problems have virtually
blocked plans to build the ELF systemsSO and
the blue-green laser system hasn't even been
tested.
*
These and other less dramatic advances in existing
and potential technologies have changed some of the major
assumptions regarding the military capability of sea-based
systems. However, as stated earlier and as seen in Figure 8
ICBMs have a significant number of distinct advantages rela-
tive to the other two legs of the Triad. Technological
advance is a two-edged sword and the same phenomenon of
geometrically enhanced technological progress that promises
significantly more capable sea-based ballistic missile
systems, could result in increasing detectability and vulner-
ability.
One recently proposed solution to the problem of
land-based ICBM vulnerability is deployment of a Shallow
Underwater Mobile (SUM) sea based ballistic missile.
This system would consist of two ICBMs strapped outside the
pressure hull of each of a fleet of small diesel powered
submarins. The SUM system would solve the accuracy and C3
problems of sea systems through dependence on shore-based
navigation and communication facilities. Figure 9 presents
an MX/SUM comparison. The key problems with such a system
include vulnerability to underwater nuclear effects (on the
*The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency plans to
^2
award two contracts for developmental efforts for this system.
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Continental Shelf) , lack of distinct vulnerability, alert
rate, and operating cost. As Lt Gen Kelly H. Burke (DCS
Research, Development, and Acquisition) states,
A sea-based system now being suggested by a few
individuals outside the Department of Defense is
the SUM, or shallow underwater missile system .
A careful evaluation of the concept shows these
submarines are neither as small nor as inexpensive,
nor as readily available as first thought. In any
event SUM is simply another ballistic missile sub-
marine without the characteristics of land-based
ICBMs and as such should logically be considered
as an alternative to the Trident, not to the MX. ^^
In a later statement Burke added:
...Among these schemes are deploying a mobile
Minuteman force, putting ICBMs on small German-
built diesel-powered submarines operating along
the Continental Shelf, or deploying MX in the
Great Lakes. . .
.
In the second case, the so-called SUM "bottom-
crawling-submarine" would hot be available until
the 1990 's and would be highly vulnerable to tidal
waves, known as the Van Dorn effect, that could be
induced by a Soviet barrage bombing of the Conti-
nental Shelf area. This tidal wave in shallow
water would crush any sub in its path. Once aware
of this phenomenon, the proponents of this
approach switched to a "Deep Underwater Missile,"
or DUM, which would make such a weapon an alter-
nate for the Trident SSBN, rather than for the
ICBMs. In case of MX ICBMs deployed in the Great
Lakes, barrage bombing, in a similar manner,
would rapidly and surely destroy such a force.
This view is supported by the Under Secretary of the
Air Force, Antonia Chayes, who states:
...Besides, we looked very hard at this so-called
Shallow Underwater-Missile System* and have con-
cluded that there are defects. It cannot operate
from the Continental Shelf—as its advocates argued
*This system (SUM) is called Shallow Underwater Mobile
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originally. It would be vulnerable there to the
effects of an attack that would create a tidal
wave.
Also, an analysis of the equipment required to
keep these submarines stable would indicate that
quite big submarines would be needed. So it
becomes a very expensive proposition and offers
no savings oyer the MX system for the same number
of warheads. ^^
Finally, as an alternative to Reflexive Strategies,
the SUM system shares with other new/derived technologies,
the problem of development and deployment time. As Bernard
T. Feld and Kosta Tsipis state:
Such a coastal submarine-based system could not
be ready for deployment in the next decade or so.
Therefore this system shares with the air-mobile
and the multiple-shelter basing mode the disad-
vantage that its unavilability for many years
might mandate the need for immediate remedial
measures (such as local defense for Minuteman
silos) , which would add to the overall cost of
restoring invulnerability to the ICBM component
of the U.S. strategic triad. ^^
While a case can be made that a SUM system could be
deployed in less than a decade, it cannot solve near term
(mid-1980' s) land-based ICBM vulnerability.
4. ABM Alternative
In addition to survivably based system, the other
major alternative to pre-impact reflexive launch strategies
is a missile site defense ABM. Several concepts have
evolved involving the use of non-nuclear kill mechanisms
and state-of-the-art simplified multi-target-track fire
control systems. ^"^ One of these programs. Homing Overlay
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Experiment (HOE) is scheduled for testing in 1982. DOD is
also examining several variants of a Low Altitude Defense
58(Load) system for terminal defense of missile silos.
Although these ground-based (and future space-based) defen-
sive systems appear practical, they have three major
problems
:
• Most ABM proposals would require abrogation or
restructuring of the existing ABM accords .^^
• Unless a massive effort is undertaken, they would
not resolve Minuteman vulnerability before the late
1980's.
• Unlike a passive defense (i.e. , survivable basing)
,
ABM systems would always be potentially vulnerable
to countermeasures and uncertainty* would always
exist relative to their (untestable) full scale
operational capability.
*This uncertainty, however, is a "two-way street:" the
Soviets (regardless of developed countermeasures) would have




V. THE CURRENT ROLE OF REFLEXIVE STRATEGIES
...Nor could they be sure that we would not launch
our ICBMs on warning or under attack (as we would




...the second option toward which the United States
is edging, faute de mieux, is to adopt the ICBM
firing tactic of launch on assessment (LOA) . Senior
Carter administration defense officials have been
uttering more and more friendly references to this
tactic. For a country with a $2 trillion GNP and
a defense budget of more than $120 billion—after
nearly a generation's warning that the silo-vulnera-
bility problem was coming—to be compelled even to




A review of recent formal and informal official state-
ments concerning employment of reflexive launch strategies,
creates an initially ambiguous—even paradoxical-picture
of U.S. policy. For example, in his 1980 DOD report,
Harold Brown said, "...But that does not mean we should
abandon the features contained in the ICBM force or make
its survival a function of launch-on-warning." ^^ However,
in a later section of the same report he adds: "Very low
survivability of ICBMs in the early 1980s will leave
tLS with very little effective quick response
hard target kill capability unless we were to adopt a
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launch-under-attack policy. "63 He further states "...In
addition, the USSR can never be sure that our ICBM force
would not be launched under the attack, increasing the
number of U.S. delivered warheads still further."^"* Similar
statements have been made by other administration officials.
According to William J. Perry (Under Secretary of Defense
Research and Engineering) , "An attacker could not be
certain that the Minuteman force would be launched before
it was destroyed, though we do not want to depend on that
uncertainty. " 65 under Secretary of the Air Force Antonia
Chayes in a recently quoted statement indicates that we do
not have a launch-under-attack doctrine, but could adopt one :
We could ignore the vulnerability and basically
change our strategic doctrine. We could move
to a launch-under-attack doctrine—that is, we
could launch our ICBMs as soon as we detected
evidence of a Soviet attack.
Secretary of Defense Harold Brown only the other
day explained why we would not wish to rely
totally on that doctrine. He pointed out that
so much can go wrong, we would not want to go to
war by computer. ^6
The above statements of DOD policy—as well as those
quoted earlier in this paper—seem to provide ambiguous
and conflicting positions. Most of this ambiguity can be
resolved by recognizing three factors:
• Reflexive launch strategies include a wide range of
options * within a framework of an infinite number of
political/military scenarios. In other words, it is
not enough to ask, "Do we want (have) a policy of
"launch-on-warning?" Rather, we should ask, are
there circumstances where the employment of an RLS
is the obvious (or only) choice?
*This has been described in detail: See Figure 5 (page 40)
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• The current situation is one of transition from
essentially invulnerable forces to vulnerable
forces—with the projection of a return to sur-
vivable land-based force posture. Any analysis
of government RLS policy statements must include
consideration of tense (stated or implied) (i.e.,
does the statement refer to current policy or
future options)
.
• The difference between a "veiled threat" and a
strategy that is dependent on reflexive response
is significant . The major objective of reflexive
launch options—like the weapons themselves—is
to deter attack. As Richard Garwin states:
Our preference by far is to avoid war with
the Soviet Union, including war initiated
by the Soviet Union with the expectation of
achieving benefits worth the threats of sub-
stantial loss to the Soviet Union. Although
it would be desirable to have forces which
are capable of surviving nuclear war and
carrying out orders of the U.S. Government
during the course of such a war, it is more
important to deter nuclear war. Therefore,
there is a role for doctrine for the use of
a capability for launch under attack/launch
on impact, as well as for declaratory policy
which informs others (more or less accurately)
of our capability and intent.
Doctrine and the declaratory policy cannot
diverge very much for the United States,
given our relatively open system of govern-
ment and press. This makes more difficult
the problem of establishing the doctrine and
declaratory policy, but eases the task of
writing about them. 67
Colin Gray also noted the deterrent value of declarations
of the possibility of employing reflexive responses:
...but handled properly, LOW has some deterrent
merit. As an operational firing tactic, it would
be monumental folly, but as a veiled suggestion of
the 'we refuse to rule it out' variety it should
not be despised. Responsible decision-makers must
retain a small suspicion that the adversary might
just launch some missiles before the incoming war-
heads arrived: one should not attempt totally to
allay this suspicion. 68
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Current public policy statements such as the following
one by the Department of State support this concept of
"veiled suggestion:"
...and would the United States launch its own ICBMs
once, it was determined that a massive Soviet ICBM
attack was underway, thus leaving only empty holes
for the Soviet missiles to hit.^^
Similarly, Secretary of State Vance in a quote from
a recent television interview said, "No one should
assume those missiles wouldn't be launched before
they were struck by incoming missiles. "^^
Harold Brown reinforced this concept of deterring
uncertainty in stating, "And they would face a
considerable risk that we could* launch all or part
of our ICBMs before they could be destroyed—thus
frustrating whatever objective the Soviet attack
might have had. "71
The most current and definitive statement of United
States RLS policy is contained in the 1981 DOD Annual
Report
:
Why should we not settle for the new status quo
and plan to launch our ICBMs on warning, or
replace MINUTEMAN—if we must replace it at all
—
with what some would call a less threatening
(meaning less versatile and effective) system
than MX?
These questions have several answers. The first
is that it is one thing (and by no means an easy
one*) to have an operational capability to launch
nuclear weapons, with warning or under attack.
It is quite another matter to be obliged to launch
them simply to avoid losing them to the attacker.
The latter posture, with its vulnerability to
accidents and false alarms, and still more with
its premium on hasty action rather than delibera-




states. In a given situation, the President may
decide to order a launch, with or without warning.
The duty of the Department of Defense is to plan
and procure systems so that the force can ride out
an attack if that is what the situation calls for,
and what the President directs. It is not our duty
to force his hand. 72
Thus it can be seen that it is not that the current U.S.
policy is ambiguous, but rather that this question is a
complex admixture of varying political, technical and
timing elements. It is clear from the above statement as
well as procurement initiatives that the current U.S. policy
is to restore land-based missile system survivability as
well as to enhance the capability for reflexive response.
This RLS potential is designed to act as an element of
general deterrence and to provide an operational capability
for rapid response under appropriate situational conditions.
A. THE PARADOX OF "INTERIM SOLUTIONS"
As stated above, analysis of the utility of RLS options
must be tied to both timeframe* and the political/military
scenario. Comprehension of this timeframe concept aids in
alleviating apparent ambiguity in both strategic literature
and government statements. For example, many of those who
(like Secretary of Defense Brown) believe that a survivable
land-based ICBM is the only appropriate permanent solution
to existing force vulnerability, see at least a threat of RLS
Timeframe refers to the state of the strategic balance
(e.g., today'
s





employment as an acceptable interim element of general
deterrence.
Viewpoints regarding reflexive options generally fall
into three main categories.
• Those who abhor any use of RLS threats or operational
doctrine.
• Those who support RLS as a permanent solution to land-
based ICBM vulnerability.
• Those who see some utility in RLS as a part of general
deterrence and/or a "valuable backstop if either
super power found itself temporarily embarrassed by
technical surprise or a tardy response to the develop-
ment of an advisary counter-force capability. 7 3
A large proportion of strategic thinkers fall into this
third group. They view relfexive options as a strategic
"spare tire:" their availability provides added confidence
when the strategic system is strong and in times of strategic
setback they provide an interim solution. This analogy of
RLS as a sort of "spare tire" aids in resolving the paradox
of "interim solutions:" that is, if RLS is acceptable as
an interim solution, why is any further action required?
As Patrick Parker has said, "This is the problem of all
' interim solutions • —they tend to be viewed as permanent
cures." ^'^ The other principal argument opposing reflexive
options—as even an interim solution—is that the extensive
cost and effort required to construct a credible RLS system
could better be applied to accelerating a more robust and
lasting solution. Although an excellent case exists for
accelerating critically required force modernization, the
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hardware and analysis required to develop an enhanced RLS
capability is needed for other vital purposes* and thus
RLS may be viewed as a king of "free" option.
*This subject is discussed in depth later in this paper,
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VI. ISSUES AND PROBLEMS
A. TARGETING FOR RLS
However, an important issue surrounding the launch-
under-attack option is "launch what against what
Soviet targets—upon what degree of evidence that




One of the principal objections to reflexive response is
the targeting issue. This argument has it's roots in what
M. R. Gustavson calls the concept of "launch-to-destruction-
on-warning. "76 This concept-espoused primarily by those who
attempt to totally dismiss reflexive options—conveys an
image of an PlLS as automatic escalation to an all-out counter-
value retaliation. Upon close examination, it becomes clear
that the false premise on which this argument is based is
that there are essentially only two types of targets
—
missile silos or populations.
The argument against countervalue/population targeting
for reflexive retaliation is the obvious one of unthinking,
and possibly unwarranted, escalation. As Donald R. Westervelt
has written.
The concept of launch-on-warning has been deplored
in the context of a spasm-response countervalue-
oriented strategic emphasis. It is quite a different
situation when counterforce objectives are primary,
when an opposing force is known to have the character-
istics imputed to future Soviet forces, and when the
warning is based on observation of an attack as massive
as would be necessary in any attempt to disarm us. 77
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The case against a countersilo rlS is that we probably
would not know which silos were empty and would thus expend
hundreds of warheads to no avail. Further, it has been
suggested that even if we did have knowledge* of the dis-
tribution of Soviet reserve ICBMs; a U.S. countersilo RLS
would force escalation by driving the Soviets to exercise
a launch-on-warning of their residual (countervalue) forces.
A final (game theory) argument against counterforce RLS is
that, given a number of assumptions, we would not improve
the numbers balance in such an exchange. As T. K. Jones
has stated, We have done some analysis of launch-on-warning.
Assuming the Russians would launch if we did, we have found
7 8that we are worse off if both sides do it." The question
of relative advantage resulting from reflexive counterforce
response to a Soviet first strike—like all simulations
—
is most significantly influenced by the assumptions (i.e.
,
accuracy, reliability, etc.); however, ICBM throwweight
advantage results in a Soviet numerical superiority as the
"bottom line" of most of these calculations.
The fact that populations and silos are not appropriate
targets for reflexive responses should not be equated with
a paucity of targets. As Marshal Grechko has written:
*This knowledge could be based on real-time reconnaissance





The Strategic Missile Forces, which form the basis
of the combat might of our Armed Forces, are in-
tended for the destruction of the enemy's means of
nuclear attack, his large troop formations and
military bases, the destruction of the aggressor's
defense industry, the disorganization of (his) state
and military command and control, and the operations
of his rear and transportation . * 7^
Soviet writings are a useful source for compiling
"appropriate" RLS targets for it is, after all, the Soviets
whom we would attempt to deter through adoption of an RLS
posture. Colonel M. Shirokov suggests some other possi-
bilities:
In determining these targets, application should
be made of the industrial branch principle and
the selected critical links in the economy. . . . ^^
Shirokov suggests large power stations, oil storage/
production, large blast furnaces, steel plants, chemical
facilities, rail yards and other transportation centers. 81
Richard L. Garwin recommends a similar target mix for re-
flexive forces:
Since it is inefficient to attempt to produce such
damage to the Soviet ICBM force, the targets should
be the highest-value targets in the conventional
military forces (divisional headquarters, marshal-
ling yards, troop concentrations, and the like)
,
and the United States should attack directly massive
industrial and infrastructure investments up to a
number which would result in a similar level of
casualties on the Soviet side. This would mean
primarily military-related industry, nuclear-energy
facilities, dams, aircraft concentrations, and the
like, including installations for defense against




Roger Speed presents a different "problem" associated
with RLS target selection:
The primary reason for maintaining a triad of
strategic forces is to guarantee that, at a
minimum, the United States can maintain an
assured-destruction capability to deter an
all-out attack on American cities. If a Soviet
attack were directed only at U.S. strategic
forces, the launch-on-warning policy would be i
faced with a dilemma. If the U.S. ICBMs were
directed against Soviet cities, this would
assure that U.S. cities would also be attacked,
which is the opposite of what is desired. If,
on the other hand, U.S. ICBMs were directed
against Soviet military targets instead of
cities, they would no longer be available to
deter attacks on U.S. cities. In either case,
a LOW policy fails to serve its main purpose
—
^ 33
to maintain a U.S. assured-destruction capability .
The above analysis contains three major flaws;
• It does not consider targets other than "cities"
(population) or "military targets." Examples
include isolated manufacturing and energy facili-
ties as well as dams, transportation centers and
other key targets.
• It implies that the principal value of the U.S.
ICBM force is countervalue deterrence. While
Minuteman could be used in a countervalue/countervalue
deterrence role, it's primary advantage lies in its
accurate hard target kill potential.
As the FY1980 JCS Military Posture states:
The Minuteman II 's long range accuracy and single
warhead provides a weapon for use against some
hardened targets.
...Modernization programs include an improvement
in accuracy on all missiles and the replacement
of the MK-12 reentry vehicle (RV) with the MK-12A
warhead on 300 Minuteman III ICBMs in FY1980-1982.
These improvements will help the United States
maintain current capability against an increasingly
hardened Soviet target base. 84
69

In 1974, Secretary Schlesinger made a similar analysis:
My own judgment is that the ICBM force always had a
role to play except in the assured destruction
notions which were regarded by some as a deux ex
machina as a substitute for thinking about the
program. 85
Harold Brown uses the following assumptions in an analysis
of U.S. response to a Soviet counterforce attack.
We assume that the initial Soviet attack uses ICBM
warheads against U.S. silos, forward-deployed SLBM
warheads against time urgent C-^ and bomber ports
and other supporting installations. The U.S. re-
taliatory counterforce attack uses surviving ICBM
and SLBM warheads against Soviet bomber bases, SSBN
ports and hardened C^ targets, and surviving ICBM
and bomber warheads against Soviet silos.
Speed fails to account for the deterrent value that would
remain in SLBMs and the bomber/ALCM force regardless of the
disposition* of the ICBMs.
• The motivation for a launch-on-warning policy is not
"to maintain a U.S. assured-destruction capability;"
the purpose is to deter a pre-emptive, counterforce
attack and, failing that, to exercise time-urgent
hard/semi-hard target kill capability.
Although the concept of reflexive response is hindered
by many complex—and perhaps insurmountable
—
problems , a
shortage of appropriate targets (short of a full scale
countervalue response) is not among them. As Soviet Major
General Anureyev has written:
For undermining the enemy's strategic potential
there is no need for its complete destruction.
For this it can be sufficient to put out of action
one of its most important elements. In this
*Launched-under-attack or destroyed in their silos.
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connection an enormous role is acquired by the
working out of the scientific criteria and prin-
ciples of selection of targets, and also the means
of influencing them. The qualified solution to the
given problem requires the participation along with
military specialists, of economists, sociologists,
engineers, and physicians.^^
B. RLS FORCE COMPOSITION
Closely associated to the targeting issue is the question
of RLS force composition (i.e., How many do we launch?). The
prevalent assumption is that launch-on-warning/under-attack
implies launching the entire force to prevent its destruc-
tion. As Paul Wolfowitz testified, "If our response were in
fact to be as swift and certain as it is supposed to be, any
attack no matter how small or controlled, would result in
total war."S8
A full scale launch of several thousand Minuteman warheads-
even if aimed at military targets—would result in significant
numbers of Soviet casualties, as well as loss of residual
U.S. prompt hard-target kill capability. Alternatively,
retention of large portions of the force, in the face of an
effective all out counterforce attack, would result in its
loss. Additionally, a gray area exists involving the question
of how to respond to a small scale or accidental attack.
Richard Garwin supports a tactic of launching a portion of




Only a limited number (say, 50) of Minutemen need or
should be launched—unarmed, subject to command-arm
in flight. One hopes that launch-under-attack will
never occur inappropriately, in response to false
indication of sensors, or other cause. Should such
an unwarranted launch occur, however, we would prefer
not to have armed the missiles, nor would we want to
disarm ourselves by having launched the entire ICBM
force, which would thus be lost to our future capa-
bility... It seems reasonable that no more than 50
percent of the Minutemen need be considered for launch
under attack even in the event of what appears to be
an attack against the entire force. This conclusion
stems from the observation that a pre-launch surviva-
bility of Minuteman of 0.5 would seem to preclude
great enthusiasm for rebasing of the Minuteman force
or for replacing it with an invulnerable force; hence,
achieving the equivalent survivability by a commitment
to launch as much as 50 percent of the ICBM force on
attack should be adequate. ^^
The essence of Garwin's argument is not the defensive
value of the proposal, but its effectiveness as a deterrent ,
A critical weakness in this plan, and in fact all reflexive
remedies, is the problem of pin-down-and-destroy tactics.
As Garwin himself acknowledges:
Depending on the actual number of megatons per
minute required for pin-down, the SLBM fleet
may or may not be able to prevent the launch of
the Minuteman force. If it can, then the ICBM
force could prolong this pin for several hours.
Should the SLBM not be adequate to provide pin-
down, it may be tnat an ICBM raid small enough
not to trigger a launch-under-attack system
could provide a continuing pin-down while a
massive attack on Minuteman got underway. Thus,
a pin-down attack might be a way of beating a
launch-under-attack system, but only if the





The Achilles' heel of reflexive concepts is the potential
disabling effect of pin-down tactics. A pin-down attack
concists of a vanguard of warheads detonated above the
missile fields to create a mixture of nuclear effects* that
effectively prevents Minuteman launch pending arrival of the
main Soviet counterforce attack.
There are two basic means of executing this tactic:
• Utilizing a small number of ICBMs to create un-
certainty and inhibition of a luanch-on-warning
response. This approach relies on deception to
pin-down the force prior to full scale attack.
• Employment of SLBMs for pin-down prior to attack.
This tactic is the most probable and relies on the
short time of flight (and warning) of an SLBM
attack.
It is the possibility of an SLBM pin-down tactic that is the
most devastating technical argument against reflexive strate-
gies. The essence of the problem is that even with perfect
warning, the reaction time from first indication to Minuteman
launch must be less than fifteen minutes.** If the thirty
minute flight time of an ICBM stresses the capability of
a reflexive system, then the less than fifteen minute
decision window of a pin-down scenario virtually destroys
the credibility of the entire concept. However, as has been
stated earlier, to determine the credibility of a reflexive
*Electromagnetic pulse (EMP) to disturb electronics, radia-
tion to damage warheads and dust and blast to damage missile
structures.
**Use of depressed trajectory SLBM would provide less than




response, the entire spectrum of political-military situa-
tional factors must be considered. For example, if the
PAVE PAWS SLBM warning radar reports a massive launch that
is the culmination of a deteriorating political crisis
accompanied by extensive Soviet mobilization including
significant numbers of forward deployed SSBNs, then a re-
flexive response capability might be a credible deterrant.
Although considerable uncertainty exists concerning the
real-world effects of any pin-down attempt, it still remains
the most significant problem affecting reflexive options.
As Paul Wolfowitz states:
The vulnerability of ICBMs during the first stage of
flight means that even a few overhead detonations
would prevent us from launching Minuteman. Thus we
could never be certain that an attack was really a
"limited" one, and not one designed to keep our
missiles in their silos until a full-scale attack
arrived.
We would thus have to respond before the arrival of
even a limited number of submarine-launched missiles.
Such missiles can be fired from much closer to the
United States along trajectories which would bring
them to their targets in ten minutes or less. They
could penetrate our present* radar network with
virtually no warning at all. Even with improvements
in our warning system, there will be at most ten
minutes for our entire response, from radar sighting





But almost all who have looked at this problem
agree that once we make it an accepted or
standard procedure to fire ICBMs on warning,
it begins to get very easy to write scenarios
for accidental war. Indeed, one of the main
reasons the current system can be considered
relatively stable and in any way "acceptable,"
is that we assume the doctrine of both sides
is not to fire on warning. ^^
Herman Kahn
1969
One of the major hurdles facing construction of an RLS
system and adopting a reflexive posture is the conflicting
requirements of dependence on certain, rapid—virtually
automatic—response and the need for a system that precludes
inadvertent launch. Although these are not—theoretically
—
mutually exclusive design goals, those systems and procedures
that optimize one of the above two goals tend to degrade the
other.
As early as 1960, Herman Kahn commented on the problems
of designing a "fail-safe" RLS system:
A complete positive control" reaction is not possible
for the ICBM. It cannot "fail safe." Even if one
had a destruct-mechanism, whereby ICBMs that were shot
off by mistake could be destroyed in the air, it would
not be satisfactory to react to a false alarm. First,
it would be too expensive. Second, and even more im-
portant, we could not be sure that the destruct-
mechanism would be 100 percent reliable. Therefore,
it is quite unlikely that any order could or should
be given to fire ICBMs on any but the most certain
type of evidence.




An obvious danger arises from the fact that any
decision to "launch on warning" would have to be
made in a short time and on the basis of early
radar signals" The crucial judgment as to the
reliability and significance of the signals would
necessarily be made by technicians and military
officers at the observation centers. The President
would have neither the time nor the technical compe-
tence to question their evaluations. If the radar
operators informed him that the signals could not
yet be clearly identified as coming from Russian
missiles, or if his scientific adviser (if he could
be reached) suggested that the signals could possi-
bly be the result of some natural phenomenon, or if
reports were coming from some radar stations but not
others, the President would want an explanation, but
there would be little time to obtain one. Under
such circumstances the danger of starting World War
III by mistake would become frighteningly real .^^
The technical advances of the two decades since Herman
Kahn's succinct analysis of the systemic problem of design-
ing a fail-safe RLS system have failed to change the basic
weaknesses of the concept. As Fred Ikle recently remarked:
The more you lean on any such system, the more
you are driven to make it taut and rapidly
responding, which means that you're increasing
the risk of some kind of short circuit. Making
the system taut could also mean putting incredi-
ble responsibility on some tech sergeant in the
innards of the system. The more quick and auto-
matic it is, the more you're turning over de-
cisions—the most fateful decisions in the
nation's history—to people far removed from the
President and the Joint Chiefs..
Three events within seven months during 1980 substan-
tiated Mr. Ikle's contentions. The first incident involved
a NORAD computer mechanical malfunction that allowed an
alert signal on a simulation tape to be broadcast to some
of the strategic forces. Then, during one week in June,
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two additional computer malfunctions "set off a false warning
of a Soviet multiple missile attack. "^^ In all of the above
incidents the miscalculation was quickly discovered and the
strategic force alert cancelled. It is precisely because
the current strategic suite is not totally dependent on
reflex for survival that disaster was averted in these three
incidents. Additionally, reaction to these incidents was
moderate (precautionary alert) because they occurred without
other political or military signals.
Some analysts like William R. Graham believe it is
beyond the state-of-the-art to design an accident proof
"launch-on-warning" system:
Therefore, to be consistent with nuclear weapon
safety requirements, the mandatory "Launch-on-
Warning" system would have to be much less sus-
ceptible to unwarranted triggering than are
individual nuclear weapons. For something so
complex as the "Launch-on-Warning" system,
satisfying such a safety requirement goes
beyond the range of existing technical experience,
and becomes at best a highly speculative endeavor.
This concern is compounded by the requirement of insuring
that weapons are launched in an actual attack. A reflexive
system consists of two major elements, a communication
system and a sensor network; Graham views both of these
element as intrinsically fragile and thus susceptible to
failure and/or attack:
...sensors tend to be fragile. As they must
necessarily be rather sensitive devices, the
possibility exists that they could be "jammed,"
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or fed a high level of interference. They would
also be subject to destruction by either nuclear
or non-nuclear direct attack. The system would
then degenerate to one of "Launch-on-Blindness"
or "Launch-on-Loss of Sensor," rather than "Launch-
on-Warning.
"
Communication systems contain long, tenuous paths
separated by isolated nodes. Jamming has the
potential to be effective against the paths, while
the nodes may be subject to direct physical attack.
Providing rigorous protection for either long com-
munication paths or isolated and often unattended
nodes has not in the past proven to even approach
being practical. *^^
Finally, the final link in an RLS system is the President
who must react quickly and determine if a launch is indicated,
Given the automation and complexity of an effective RLS
system, there is reasonable doubt as to whether a President
would hesitate to take so grave a step based solely on
sensors, signals, and readouts.** As Deborah Shapley states:
Politically, a launch-on-warning policy would raise
a storm of domestic controversy, not only from arms
controllers, who would worry about the dangers of
such hair-trigger launches, but from conservatives
who would complain that a President confronted with
blinking machines and a horrendous choice might
hesitate , do nothing for 25 minutes, and lose his
^gland-based ICBM's without striking back in return.
E. THE POLITICAL PROBLEMS OF A "HAIR TRIGGER" DETERRENT
1. Reaction Time and the Decision Process
If one word can be used to describe the fundamental
*Smphasis added.
**It is one thing to react to a phone call that states
"Mr. President, Minot is under attack"— it is quite another




Eight minutes and counting).
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flaw in any reflexive remedy to ICBM vulnerability it is
time. Though existing technology has provided the maximum
possible warning time, human limitation becomes the ultimate
constraint.
Paul Wolfowitz in his definitive Senate testimony
emphasized that time constraints are inherent in the human
decision process (for so grave a decision) and are not
simply due to "technical" (i.e., resolvable) deficiencies:
It is suggested that we would have twenty
minutes of warning before an attack arrived.
This is very little time just for making such
a decision—to say nothing of first transmit-
ting the warning to the President (whatever
the time of day or night and wherever he might
be) , and afterwards transmitting the orders to
launch. In addition time would be needed just
to distinguish radar indications of an impending
attack from the background of innocuous and
spurious signals. There would be no time to
clarify ambiguities in the radar signals, to
investigate the source or the extent of the
attack, or to adjust our plan of retaliation.
The example of Pearl Harbor, and more recently,
the Pueblo seizure, show that messages and
warnings may travel slowly and arrive too late.
Steps would certainly be taken to speed the flow
of information if our deterrent depended solely
on timely warning. But a dilemma exists which
no amount of care or expense can eliminate com-
pletely. By reducing the amount of checking
and consultation and increasing the speed of our
reaction, we would increase the risk that inade-
quate information or unauthorized commands could
result in accidental war. A warning system which
alerted the President at the first unidentified
radar blips would, at a minimum, increase
tensions—unless, like the "man who cried wolf,"
the warnings began to be ignored. At worst, such




As Herman Kahn described the problem:
In analyzing the usefulness of any warning and
reaction proposal, we should differentiate
between the physical reaction time—that is,
the time it takes the system to implement the
order to institute any particular reactions
—
and the effective reaction time which includes
the time for receiving information, evaluating
it, and making the decisions to react in an
appropriate way. The more innocuous the reac-
tion and the better the information gathering
and evaluation, the more automatic and fast we
can afford to make the reaction. 101
Although time is the crucial factor in the reflexive
scenarios, many analysts have focused on the wrong aspect of
this time constraint. Amoretta and Francis Hoeber, for
example, have included target selection as a requirement
of the decision process: "With almost zero decision-making
time available, the policy question would arise, launch-on-
1 02
warning against what?" While it is true that, in many
scenarios, the time required for the decision process may
exceed the time available (and that target systems must be
selected) , the target issue has been overemphasized. A
spurious element in the discussion of time constraints
and the decision process is a dual part assumption :
• -that the specific response (i.e., force
level and target (s) for a reflexive option
must be developed "on the spot." Some ob-
servers attempt to paint a picture of a
blear-eyed President in his pajamas toiling
over a target map with six minutes to go
before impact. In fact, detailed options
can and must be preselected for a reflexive
system. In such a system a selection would
be made from a menu of appropriate responses.
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• the second interacting and false part of this
assumption is that if RLS is completely dis-
carded and survivable forces constructed,
decisions could be carefully developed in any




of reconnaissance and C^ assets that might obvi-
ate RLS also severely limit the capabilities for
post-attack analysis. It is simply not true
that a "better" decision can be made through
post-attack analysis: If the White House, the
Pentagon, the CIA/DIA, the defense satellites,
and communication links with forces/allies have
been destroyed, can a "better "** decision be
made? Who would make such a decision and what
would be its objective?
The question of decision-maker and the devolution of
authority are also a problem for the reflexive system
decision process. Richard Garwin suggests one solution:
Naturally, the NCA is not the person of the
President but his duly constituted power, as
provided by law. The preservation of NCA for
the period of decision to launch under attack
is a lessor problem than its preservation
throughout a prolonged nuclear war. In particu-
lar, there should be a clearly designated line
of devolution of the NCA authority in certifying
the assessment of a massive Soviet raid on the
ICBM silos so that the previously-taken decision
to launch under attack will proceed; however,
the President himself, having the authority to
retrieve all powers of the President when he is
in communication, would be able to veto the
decision to launch, if his communications provide
him with data on which he feels able to judge.
A cryptographic authentication method will ensure
that the veto comes from the President. -'-^^
Such a plan, however, has several serious drawbacks;
as William Graham states:
*There is no doubt that survivable forces (e.g., MX) are
required to markedly enhance deterrence and reduce incentive
for attack.
**i.e., "better" than during the trans-attack period.
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Finally, the key person at the end of the
chains, presumably the President, has his-
torically proven to be vulnerable to small
but determined attacks. Since there is no
way to assure the survival of the President
at all times, a predelegation of ICBM launch
authority would have to be made if the "Launch-
on-Warning" policy was to continue to be credi-
ble immediately following the removal of the
President, a possibility that frequently could
be under the control of the Soviets. Further-
more, the devolution of authority to a pre-
delegated chain of successors to the President
would have to be carried out so smoothly that
not even minutes would be lost in establishing
who was to make the decision to launch the
ICBMs, locating him, and providing him with the
necessary facilities and information. In addi-
tion to presenting another impediment to the
timely operation of a launch-on-warning system,
by increasing the number of persons who must be
able to launch the ICBMs, the issue of pre-
delegation and continuity of authority creates
additional problems in the area of nuclear
safety. ^^^
In the final analysis, the answer to the question, "Is
there sufficient time to exercise LOW/LUA?" is again dependent
on the military/political scenario. Two basic possibilities
exist:
• Escalation within the context of a political/
military crisis.
• Surprise attack
In the first case, a "rational" excursion up the
escalation ladder, a threat of reflexive response would be
credible. International stakes, positions, and consequences
would all have been calculated. Most significantly, as the
situation deteriorated the requisite (attack/retaliate)
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mind-set would exist to enable swift response. A crisis
situation in which a significant portion of one side's forces
are temptingly vulnerable is obviously an unstable one; but
it is also this imbalance that makes the possibility of
reflexive response a credible deterrent. The resulting
crisis instability is the principal problem of vulnerable
forces shielded only by the option of "quick-draw" tactics.
The second case, surprise attack , is more demanding.
It is one thing for a President to order a launch-under-
attack in the wake of a major confrontation while flying
in the E-4 (Airborne Command Post) . It is quite another
to imagine the President being awakened at 0400 and told:
"Mr. President, we have satellite and PAVE PAWS indication
of a massive Soviet assault on the central U.S.—there are
also conflicting reports of Soviet conventional mobilization.
We have rechecked all our sensors and estimate first impact
(SLBM) in five minutes." Such a chilling scenario—if
possible—would virtually rule out a credible reflexive
response. Although reflexive response is least credible
for a "bolt from the blue" attack, a "bolt from the blue
attack" is itself the least credible possiblility. * Even
the classic "surprise" attack at Pearl Harbor cannot be
considered to be a "bolt from the blue;" it occurred within
the context of an already grave world situation. The problems
*However, the fact that a capability/possibility exists,
demands development of defended or mobile ICBM forces.
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associated with developing a disarming first strike that is
supportive of rational political goals are as insurmountable
as designing a foolproof launch-on-warning system. The key
element of this assertion is the concept of rational goals .
The enormous risks assumed by a Soviet initiated "surprise"
thermonuclear attack would have to be balanced by the pro-
bability of achieving significant goals. To achieve such
goals (e.g. , occupation of western Europe) extensive prepa-
ration would be required. As Sidney Drell testified:
In particular he (T. K. Jones) calculates that
"A full three-day evacuation of the type called
for in Soviet plans would reduce fatalities to
no more than 10 million people."
. . .We can assume that the United States would
have at least three full days of intelligence
available of ominous and imminent Soviet in-
tentions as they evacuate their cities. Under
these circumstances I can neither accept nor
understand the assumption in his calculations
that no more than one-half of our strategic
arsenal would survive a Soviet first strike
and be available for retaliation. To the con-
trary, an appropriate U.S. response in the face
of this clearly provocative Soviet action could
be to put our entire retaliatory arsenal on the
highest status of alert and out on station. The
President could announce furthermore that we are
moving to a launch-on-warning policy for the
duration of the provocation. *105
Of greatest import is not that surprise attacks are
improbable, but rather that they are possible. Throughout
history surprise attack could and did occur; and although




rationality is a direct function of both circumstance
(dynamics) and perception (values)
.
Technology has theoretically reduced the prospect
of surprise, but the problem of too little data has been
replaced by one of too much data . The sheer volume and
attendant possibility of ambiguity could dictate hesitation
and a failure to act promptly. Roger Speed offers some
additional considerations:
Although the United States may be confident
of its capability to detect an impending
attack, the historical record gives little
justification for such confidence.
...The predominant viewpoint is that although
there are generally clear indications of an
approaching crisis, these signals are usually
lost in the noise of competing and contradic-
tory signals. Others have argued that decep-
tion is the key to surprise. That is,
background noise is not always just irrelevant
information but often a deliberate attempt to
transmit disinformation to deceive the other
party. This was the case not only in Hitler's
surprise attack on Russia but also in the Arab
attack on Israel in 1973. 10^
The problem is that even if warning signals are available,
they may be ignored. This results from what Speed describes
as, "a tendency to 'mirrow image' and to act under the
assumption that the other side shares one's own conceptual
framework. ... "-'-'^'^ Comprehension of the limitations of
"mirrow image" analysis does not necessarily equate to




One need not postulate either wholly rational
or completely benevolent Soviet leaders virtu-
ally to rule out such a "strike from the blue"
against NATO Europe (or against the United
States)
. Indeed, one anthropologist charac-
terized the belief that the U.S.S.R. might
launch a first strike as "...a projection of
our own (American) image of what happens when
two opponents face each," and not as a realis-
tic assessment of Soviet behavior. '^^
Unfortunately, analysis of Soviet writings does not support
Coffey's contention. As Joseph D. Douglass, Jr., and
Amoretta M. Hoeber have written:
The preponderant base of evidence in the Soviet
literature designed for internal use calls for
their striking first against the West with
maximum surprise when the situation calls for
war and when the factors are in the Soviet
favor. 109
A statement in Voyennaya mysi supports this analysis:
. . .And confidence in the success of a nuclear
attack can occur in conditions whereby there
is a sufficiently high guarantee that nuclear
strikes will be delivered to the objectives
of destruction, that a mass launch of ballis-
tic missiles and takeoff of aircraft will
occur for a relatively long time undetected
by the country against which the attack is
being carried out, and that the armed forces,
and above all the strategic nuclear means of
the enemy, will suffer such destruction that
they will be incapable of carrying out a
powerful retaliatory nuclear strike. -''-^
While an isolated quotation from a Soviet military journal
(circa 1968) does not equate to an inside look at the
Russian game plan for WWIII, it does shed some light on




The problem with surprise attacks is not their high
probability, but rather their devastating consequences.
Although analysis based on averages, theory, and cost/benefit
trade-off might support a case for maintaining a force
"protected" only by firing doctrine, the consequences of
miscalculation—no matter how "improbable"—are so grave
that the risk is unacceptable . As Douglass and Hoeber
conclude:
Therefore, although an attack out of the
blue is often regarded in the United States
as a "worst-case" fantasy and not "worth
spending much money on" and although it may
be impossible—by definition—to conclusive-
ly support the idea that anyone , including
the Soviets, would deliberately start a
global nuclear war, the converse, i.e.,
that they would not strike first, is extremely
difficult to consider valid in the absence of
an enormous change in the foundation of their
underlying military thought—laws, principles,
tactics, strategy, and doctrine. -'-^-'
2. Soviet Perceptions
Analysis of the threat of counterforce attack and
the offsetting utility of reflexive options must include an
assessment of Soviet perception. Important to this analysis
is Soviet perception of U.S. response and predictability; as
Jiri Valenta has written:
Several times in the past, Soviet leaders had
been unpleasantly surprised by U.S. responses,
such as the U.S. intervention in Korea in 1950,
Kennedy's blockade of Cuba in 1962, and the
decision to bomb North Vietnam while Kosygin
was visiting Hanoi in 1965. As Soviet Foreign
Minister Gromyko once complained to U.S.
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Ambassador J. L. Beam: " You're so unpre -
dictable. We can't count on American
policy . "*fl2
Soviet statements and literature demonstrate that they
are well aware of the technical and political aspects of
reflexive response. For example, in 1959, when the Soviets
found themselves vulnerable to attack, they espoused RLS
as a deterrent
:
A vivid exhibition of national impulsiveness
at the highest level of government was
described by Averell Harriman in his account
of a meeting with Krushchev in 1959. "Your
generals," said Khrushchev, "talk of main-
taining your position in Berlin with force.
This is bluff," With what Harriman describes
as angry emphasis, Khrushchev went on, "If you
send in tanks, they will burn and make no
mistake about it. If you want war, you can
have it, but remember it will be your war.
Our rockets will fly automatically." At this
point, according to Harriman, Khrushchev's
colleagues around the table chorused the word
"automatically. "*113
In the above performance, Khrushchev emphasized not only the
force survival element of reflexive response, but also the
need for adversary caution resulting from the Soviet Leader's
"tenuous" control of force commitment. Although access to
authoritative Soviet technical publications is limited,
the following excerpt exemplifies Soviet consideration of





The combat readiness of strategic missile
complexes is defined as the time required
for preparing missiles for launch from
different conditions. There are four
classes of combat readiness, depending on
the condition of the complex: transport,
constant, high, and total combat readiness.
The highest level of combat readiness is :.
total combat readiness, characterized by
time t for preparation and launch of
missiles.
During designing of missile complexes,
efforts are made to reduce t^ to a minimum.
The reason for this is that as t^ is decreased
it is possible to launch a large number of
rockets before attacking warheads of the
enemy fall upon the combat positions. However,
a reduction in the time of preparation for
launch and the launching of missiles is usually
brought about by adding extra equipment. There-
fore, it is accompanied by a reduction in relia-
bility and an increase in the cost of the
complex. * 114
In addition to espousing RLS advantages, the Soviets
have also articulated the technical vulnerabilities of re-
flexive tactics:
A considerable threat to the intercontinental
ballistic missiles are powerful nuclear explo-
sions set off at great altitudes, because the
impulses of electromagnetic energy created by
such explosions can put out of commission not
only the on-board missile equipment, but also
the ground electronic equipment of the launch
complexes. H^
Joseph Douglass and Amoretta Hoeber postulate a Soviet strategy
including the exploitation of these effects (time urgent pin-





A U.S. launch-on-warning capability is a major
concern of the Soviets may be the U.S. strategy
that they assume in their analyses. It is
quite possible that part of the motivation for
stationing missiles in Cuba might have been
—
and may still be—associated with the desire
to strike extremely time-sensitive targets (e.g.
,
command/control centers) before appropriate
actions to launch the Minuteman missiles could
be taken. In this regard, the Soviets recognize
explicitly that one of the advantages of
submarine-launched ballistic missiles is that
they can be launched near the United States and,
hence, have a shorter flight time. This enables
the Soviets to increase the probability of
destroying command/control and launch centers
prior to the launch of the missile force. The
submarine component of Soviet forces, therefore,
may well be designed at least partially to be
used early, rather than to be withheld, as has
been the U.S. approach. -'--^^
Soviet military writing is dominated by emphasis on
the element of surprise in conducting disarming attacks. For
example. Lieutenant General Shuryrin stated that:
...one must keep in mind that the aggressors
will not be able to make full use for their
purposes of their strategic means of attack.
A portion of these means of weapons delivery
will be destroyed or damaged before their
launching while they are still on their
launch sites, bases and airfields: another
portion will be destroyed or damaged by the
weapons of the Air Defense in flight at the
approaches to the territory of the socialist
camp; still another portion of the missiles
and aircraft will fail to reach their targets
for technical reasons (i.e., malfunction) .-'-'
'
Recognizing the decisive significance of a surprise
counterforce attack, the Soviets are prepared to employ
reflex to counter it. This option will become even more
important if the United States continues to improve its
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hard target kill capability* and the Soviet Union continues
to maintain 75 percent of their warheads in fixed land-based
ICBMs. L. Glagolev and V. Larionov in an article in Inter-
national Affairs (Moscow) prescribe a solution to force
vulnerability:
The first missiles and bombers of the side on
the defensive (i.e. , the Soviet side) would
take off even before the aggressor's first
missiles to say nothing of his bombers arrive .•'•-'-°
...Foreign military analysts' were said to be
'talking through their hats' when they claimed
that 'Soviet nuclear rockets are highly vulnera-
ble and (therefore) designed for a first and not
a counter-strike; ' 'An aggressor would be unable
to destroy all the counter-strike means with his
first salvo, for these means... are dispersed.
A considerable part of them is constantly on the
move . Another, even greater part, is in a state
of almost instant readiness to take off. It is
physically impossible—to knock out all the
counter-strike means simultaneously . ' '-^-^^
Despite the extensive and sustained drive for ever
increasing and throw-weight, as exemplified by the SS-18,
the Soviets continue to contend that they are not building
a first-strike counterforce capability. Trofimenko in 1977
stated:
The Soviet Union does not subscribe to the
"first-strike doctrine." This fact is well
known and has been reaffirmed recently by
General Secretary of the CPSU Central
Committee L. I. Brezhnev in his important
foreign policy speech in Tula on January 18,
1977. Brezhnev described as "absurd and
totally unfounded" the allegation that the
Soviet Union "strives for superiority in
armaments with the aim of delivering a
'first strike' .. .The Soviet Union has always
and remains a convinced opponent of such
concepts. " 120
*Minuteman/MK12A; the Advanced Ballistic Reentry System
(ABRES) ; MX/AIRS; TRIDENT; and the Navy's MK500 MARV.
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This disparity between observed Soviet capabilities and
statement such as the one above can best be explained by
the statement in Colonel N. F. Miroshnichenko' s Military
Herald article:
An indispensible condition for achieving
surprise is secrecy. However, achieving
it is not easy. For this, along with
arrangements for countermeasures of the
enemy's reconnaissance, it is necessary
to perfect constantly the means and methods
of camouflage and of disinformation, to
raise the tactical training of officers,
their knowledge of the enemy, his tactics,
and his strong and weak sides.* 121
It is clear from the logic of Soviet hardware, despite
the ambiguous character of Soviet pronouncements , that they
maintain a capability for launch-under-attack and expect
that the U.S. may—under the proper conditions—exercise
its own RLS potential.
3. U.S. and Allied Perceptions
The launch-on-warning option is addressed re-
luctantly by strategic analysts who see it at
best as an option of desperation. 122
Walter F. Hahn
1978
...we are set on the road to launch-on-warning,
a reckless and uncertain course of action that
no nation with our resources should ever need
resort to in desperation. 123





To have a credible deterrent it must first appear
credible to ourselves and our allies. This is one of the
principal reasons RLS cannot be a substitute for survivable
forces; the United States public and our allies would never
be secure with such a tenuous and vulnerable posture. It
is not RLS as part of an entire range of strategic options*
that would cause uneasiness, but rather a dependence on
reflex for force survival.
As Johan J. Hoist stated:
Nor would a doctrine which made deterrence
dependent on a launch-on-warning (LOW)
posture seem particularly attractive to an
allied observer who is not only interested
in the credibility of the American commit-
ment to the defense of Eruope, but also
concerned about the possibility of becoming
enbroiled in a devastating conflict because
of American miscalculations. 124
Amoretta and Francis Hoeber see a more subtle per-
ceptual problem surrounding the launch-on-warning issue:
• Launch on categorical warning might leave
forever obscure in the eyes of the world
the question of who really made the first
nuclear strike. This is a nontrivial
question, unless one assumes the world
truly is wiped out in such an Armageddon
—
in which case launch-on-warning is certainly
madness. 125
*For example, survivable forces could be upgraded to




The outcome of the crisis depends simply on
who first finds the suspense unbearable.
If the leaders on either side think the
leaders on the other are about to find it
unbearable, their motive to throw the switch
is intensified. -'-2 ^
Thomas C. Schelling
1966
If pin-down is the most critical technical problem
of a launch-on-warning doctrine,* then crisis stability must
be considered its most serious political weakness. As
Herman Kahn viewed the problem:
...Under some circumstances our vulnerability
to a Russian first strike would both tempt the
Russians to initiate a war and at the same
compel them, because they might feel that we




Kahn's message is that vulnerable "deterrent" forces heighten
paranoia and reduce crisis stability. The problem is further
aggravated in a situation, like the current one, in which
the Soviet Union possesses significant counterforce capa-
bility while we have much less. As Arthur Waskow summarized
the dilemma of the deadly combination of counterforce with
LOW as the "solution:"
With the pressure so enormous and the stakes
so high, there can be little doubt that each
side would be forced to try to fire first, pre-
empting the other's attack. Every major inter-
national crisis would press both sides quickly
to the brink of war, and if counter-force
strategy had been highly developed, beyond the
brink. Hair-trigger responses are built into
counter-force strategy even if they are dis-




VII. THE FUTURE OF RLS
Because reflexive launch strategies are not sufficiently
robust to be the primary shield for ICBMs, many observers
would draw the erroneous conclusion that survivable forces
(i.e., defended and/or mobile) could and should completely
—
and finally—eliminate the requirement for "hair trigger"
response capability. This analogy ("hair trigger") is an
appropriate one; although it would be unacceptably dangerous
to have an individual '
s
survival reliant on carrying a per-
petually cocked pistol/ we would by no means suggest that
there are no cases in which the option to cock the gun
—
for deterrence or defense—would be valuable or even vital.
Construction of vitally needed survivable forces will allow
us to "uncock the gun," but it will not guarantee that re-
flexive capability won't be required in the future. Even
with "survivable" forces, RLS may be required in two cases;
unforeseen vulnerability and general deterrence:
• Unforeseen vulnerability of ICBMs or defenses :
Essentially, there is no "ultimate" weapon. For
example, some defense snalysts have argued that MX
can be checked simply by increased Soviet fractionation
If the U.S.S.R. were to respond to MX deploy-
ment by increasing the number of its warheads,
it could defeat the proposed multiple-shelter
scheme for each of 200 MX missiles simply by
attacking all the shelters simultaneously.
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To make the shelters as protective as those
for our current Minuteman ICBMs would be
prohibitively costly; it also would invite
the U.S.S.R. to set up a similar system,
presenting serious new problems of verifi-
cation for U.S. reconnaissance systems. *-'-29
The question does not revolve only around MX, but rather all
strategic systems. The classic principle of Jomini still
applies: Offense can saturate defense at its weak point.
ABMs can be overwhelmed and even the "ultimate" strategic
defensive weapons, space based lasers and particle beam
3
weapons, require C and tracking systems that are vulnerable
to jamming and/or deception.
• The second case is general deterrence. The theory is
that survivable forces simply shift vulnerability from
weapons to the centers of political, military and
economic power.
Preemption can work in two ways. First and more conventionally
preemption can destroy weapon (i.e., land based ICBMs); a
second more subtle effect is the ability to obviate the will
and/or the capacity to launch these weapons. Now there is
no doubt that despite the myriad of uncertainties involves in
assuring the ability to destroy weapons, this task is far
more predictable than the ability to destroy the will to act.
However, the question remains that if we completely reject
RLS (in this case launch-after-attack) even as a deterrent
assertion, would we not be theoretically vulnerable to a
*The author does not support the contentions of this quote,
but instead presents it to illustrate that theoretical vulnera-
bilities frequently emerge even before new weapon systems are




counterforce (bomber/ALCM, C , SLBMs in port, etc. ) /counter-
state attack? If, for example, Soviet SS-18s were retrained
on Washington and the New York, Chicago and Los Angeles
financial districts, could a preemptive strike cripple U.S.
ability and/or will to retaliate? Simply stated a properly
placed bullet in the head or heart can have the same "dis-
arming" effect as one that destroys the gun itself. In 1962
Arthur Waskow discussed the same problem as it related to an
earlier "survivable" strategic system:
Rational control must rest on extremely
effective communications, and communications
would surely be one of the first casualties
of a thermonuclear war. It will be extremely
difficult even to assess the damage to American
forces caused by the first strike against us.
Missilemen in one country will probably have no
way of discovering whether the missile bases in
the next county are still capable of firing.
To get any clear picture of what damage we have
done the enemy will be enormously more difficult.
Assuming that an American government is still
functioning after the attack, it will have to
try to give orders without knowing its own sur-
viving defenses, the power left to its own
striking arm, or the targets still reauiring
destruction in the enemy's territory. -'-^^
If survivable forces are complemented by the ability and
stated determination to respond swiftly (LUA or LAA) , the
incentive-however remote—to attempt to destroy the nerve
center of the strategic systems is reduced.
Finally, the future may well provide significant advances
in the key elements of a reflexive system. Improvements in
sensors and C could change many of the assumptions pertaining
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to RLS. Of particular significance, would be development
of a real-time, man-in-the-loop (i.e., space or ground-based)
all-weather imaging ballistic missile warning sensor.* As
previously stated, it is unacceptable to expect a President
to act based only on "flashing lights and radar blips,"
but if he could sit in his office and actually watch the
300 "SS-Xs" lift-off on his wall screen, then the decision
process takes on a completely different character.





The emotion found "between the lines" of most references*
to reflexive options, results from over-simplication of what
is actually a complex issue. Inconsistent nomenclature and
incomplete definitions compound the problem: analysts
frequently lump the entire RLS concept under the misleading
(and emotionally charged) term "launch-on-warning." The
third aspect of the problem of understanding the role of re-
flexive responses is the tendency to discuss RLS outside the
context of a complete political-military scenario. Herman
Kahn, in a 1969 article about the ABM systems, stated:
The worst (and it is typical of how extreme some
people have gone in their opposition to this
system) is that we fire our Minuteman missiles
on fifteen minutes warning of an attack rather
than follow the current procedure which is to
have a capability for such firing but basically
to expect to ride out any attack on our strate-
gic forces before making any decision to fire.
It is still worthwhile to have the capability
to fire in a minute or so for a number of reasons.
For one thing, it makes the opponent cautious.
He can't be sure that you won't fire. For
another, you may, in various circumstances,
have to change doctrine at the last moment. * * 1 3
1
Finally, RLS hardware is required, whether or not the
3doctrine is adopted. The critical RLS warning and C I
systems are also required for the bomber/ALCM carriers.
*E.g., Walter F. Hahn titled his editorial on the subject,





submarines in port, civil defense, exposed mobile ICBMs and
any possible future ABM system. As William Graham has testi-
fied, "Since the strategic bomber force does depend upon
launch-on-warning for its survival, the U.S. must in any
"132
case maintain an elaborate attack warning system.
Although reflexive options will continue to play a role
both as an element of general deterrence and an interim
backstop for current strategic force deficiencies, they do
not provide sufficient depth or flexibility to be utilized
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